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Hunger during pre-harvest lean seasons is widespread in the agrarian areas of Asia 
and Sub-Saharan Africa.  We randomly assign an $8.50 incentive to households in 
rural Bangladesh to out-migrate during the lean season.  The incentive induces 22% 
of households to send a seasonal migrant, their consumption at the origin increases 
significantly, and treated households are 8-10 percentage points more likely to re-
migrate 1 and 3 years after the incentive is removed.  These facts can be explained 
qualitatively by a model in which migration is risky, mitigating risk requires 
individual-specific learning, and some migrants are sufficiently close to subsistence 
such that failed migration is very costly. We document evidence consistent with 
this model using heterogeneity analysis and additional experimental variation, but 
calibrations with forward-looking households that can save up to migrate suggest 
that it is difficult for the model to quantitatively match the data.  We conclude with 
extensions to the model that could provide a better quantitative accounting of the 
behavior.    
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This paper studies the causes and consequences of internal seasonal migration in 
northwestern Bangladesh, a region where over 5 million people live below the 
poverty line, and must cope with a regular pre-harvest seasonal famine (The Daily 
Star, 2011). This seasonal famine – known locally as monga – is emblematic of the 
widespread lean or “hungry” seasons experienced throughout South Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, in which households are forced into extreme poverty for part 
of the year.1  The proximate causes of the famine season are easily understood – 
work opportunities are scarce between planting and harvest in agrarian areas, and 
grain prices rise during this period (Khandker & Mahmud, 2012).  Understanding 
how a famine can occur every year despite the existence of potential mitigation 
strategies is, however, more challenging.  We explore one obvious mitigation 
option – temporary migration to nearby urban areas that offer better employment 
opportunities.  We randomly assigned a cash or credit incentive (of $8.50, which 
covers the round-trip travel cost) conditional on a household member migrating 
during the 2008 monga season.  We document very large economic returns to 
migration.  To explore why people who were induced to migrate by our program 
were not already migrating despite these high returns, we build a model with risk 
aversion, credit constraints and savings.   
The random assignment of incentives allows us to generate among the first 
experimental estimates of the effects of migration. Estimating the returns to 
migration is the subject of a very large literature, but one that has been hampered 
1 Seasonal poverty has been documented in Ethiopia (Dercon & Krishnan, 2000), where poverty and 
malnourishment increase 27% during the lean season, Mozambique and Malawi (Brune et al., 2011) – where 
people refer to a “hungry season”, Madagascar, where (Dostie et al., 2002) estimate that 1 million people fall 
into poverty before the rice harvest, Kenya, where (Swift, 1989) distinguishes between years that people died 
and years of less severe shortage, Francophone Africa (the soudure phenomenon), Indonesia (Basu & Wong, 
2012)  (‘musim paceklik’ or ‘famine season’ and ‘lapar biasa’ or ‘ordinary hunger period), Thailand (Paxson, 
1993), India (Chaudhuri & Paxson, 2002) and inland China (Jalan & Ravallion, 2001). 
1 
 
                                                 
by difficult selection issues (Akee, 2010; Grogger & Hanson, 2011).2  Most closely 
related to our work is a small number of experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies of the effects of migration, many of which are cited in McKenzie and Yang 
(2010) and McKenzie (2012).  These studies often exploit exogenous variation in 
immigration policies to study the effects of permanent international migration.3 
Migration induced by our intervention increases food and non-food 
expenditures of migrants’ family members remaining at the origin by 30-35%, and 
improves their caloric intake by 550-700 calories per person per day.  Most 
strikingly, households in the treatment areas continue to migrate at a higher rate in 
subsequent seasons, even after the incentive is removed.  The migration rate is 10 
percentage points higher in treatment areas a year later, and this figure drops only 
slightly to 8 percentage points 3 years later. 
These large effects on migration rates, consumption and re-migration raise 
an important question: why didn’t our subjects already engage in such highly 
profitable behavior?  This puzzle is not limited to our sample: according to 
nationally representative HIES 2005 data only 5 percent of households in monga-
prone districts receive domestic remittances, while 22 percent of all Bangladeshi 
households do.  Remittances under-predict out-migration rates, but the size and 
direction of this gap is puzzling.  The behavior also mirrors broader trends in 
international migration.  The poorest Europeans from the poorest regions were the 
ones who chose not to migrate during a period in which 60 million Europeans left 
for the New World, even though their returns from doing so were likely the 
highest (Hatton & Williamson, 1998).  Ardington et al (2009) provide similar 
evidence of constraints preventing profitable out-migration in rural South Africa.  
2 Prior attempts use controls for observables (Adams, 1998), selection correction methods (Barham & 
Boucher, 1998), matching (Gibson & McKenzie, 2010), instrumental variables (Brown & Leeves, 2007; 
McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Yang, 2008; Macours & Vakis, 2010), panel data techniques (Beegle et al., 2011) , 
and natural policy experiments (Clemens, 2010; Gibson et al., 2013) to estimate the causal impact of migration. 
3 A related literature studies the effects of exogenous changes in destination conditions on remittances, 
savings and welfare at the origin (Martinez,Claudia A.,Yang,Dean, 2005; Aycinena et al., 2010; Chin et al., 2010; 
Ashraf et al., forthcoming).     
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To interpret our experimental findings, the second part of our paper 
provides a simple benchmark model in which experimenting with a new activity is 
risky, and rational households choose not migrate in the face of uncertainty about 
their prospects at the destination.  Given a potential downside to migration (which 
we show exists in our data), households may fear an unlikely but disastrous 
outcome in which they pay the cost of moving, but return hungry after not finding 
employment during a period in which their family is already under the threat of 
famine.  Inducing the inaugural migration by insuring against this devastating 
outcome (which our grant or loan with implied limited liability managed to do) 
can lead to long-run benefits where households either learn how well their skills 
fare at the destination, or improve future prospects by allowing employers to learn 
about them.  Such frictions may be part of what keeps workers in agriculture 
despite the persistent productivity gap between rural agriculture and urban non-
agriculture sectors (Gollin et al., 2002; Caselli, 2005; Restuccia et al., 2008; Vollrath, 
2009; Gollin et al., 2011; McMillan & Rodrik, 2011).   
Experimentation is deterred by two key elements: (a) individual-specific 
risk, and (b) the fact that individuals are close to subsistence, making migration 
failure very costly.  The model is related to the “poverty as vulnerability” view 
(Banerjee, 2004) – that the poor cannot take advantage of profitable opportunities 
because they are vulnerable and afraid of losses (Kanbur, 1979; Kihlstrom & 
Laffont, 1979; Banerjee & Newman, 1991).  A model with these elements may also 
shed light on a number of other important puzzles in growth and development.  
Green revolution technologies led to dramatic increases in agricultural 
productivity in South Asia (Evenson & Gollin, 2003), but adoption and diffusion of 
the new technologies was surprisingly slow, partly due to low levels of 
experimentation and the resultant slow learning (Munshi, 2004).  Smallholder 
farmers reliant on the grain output for subsistence may not experiment with a new 
technology with uncertain returns (given the farmer’s own soil quality, rainfall and 
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farming techniques), even if they believe the technology is likely to be profitable.  
This is especially true in South Asia where the median farm is less than an acre, 
and therefore not easily divisible into experimental plots (Foster & Rosenzweig, 
2011).4  Similarly, to counter the surprisingly low adoption rates of effective health 
products (Kremer et al., 2009; Meredith et al., 2011; Miller & Mobarak, 2013), we 
may need to give households the opportunity to experiment with the new 
technology (Dupas, 2010), perhaps with free trial periods and other insurance 
schemes.  Aversion to experimentation can also hinder entrepreneurship and 
business start-ups and growth (Hausmann & Rodrik, 2003; Fischer, 2013).   
In the third part of the paper, we return to our data to assess whether 
empirical relationships are consistent with some of the qualitative predictions of 
the model.  Much of the evidence supports our structure.  We show that 
households that are close to subsistence – on whom experimenting with a new 
activity imposes the biggest risk – start with lower migration rates, but are the 
most responsive to our intervention.  The households induced to migrate by our 
incentive are less likely to have pre-existing network connections at the 
destination, and exhibit learning about migration opportunities and destinations in 
their subsequent choices on whether and where to re-migrate.   
We also conduct a new round of experiments in 2011 to test some further 
predictions of the model.  We show that migration is more responsive to incentives 
(e.g. credit conditional on migration) than to unconditional credit, because the latter 
also improves the returns to staying at home.5  We also implement another new 
treatment providing insurance for migration, and this offer induces just as many 
4 The inability to experiment due to uninsured risk has been linked to biases towards low risk low-return 
technologies that stunt long-run growth (Yesuf et al., 2009), and to reduced investments in agricultural inputs 
and technologies such as new high-yield variety seeds and fertilizer (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993; Dercon & 
Christiaensen, 2011). 
5 One might think that this is a simple rationality requirement, but it is not implied by a model in which 
households fail to migrate because they are liquidity constrained.   
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households to migrate.  Further, they respond to the insurance program design as 
if the environment is risky, and they are risk averse.    
Results of these tests notwithstanding, it is still somewhat puzzling that the 
households we induced were not experimenting with migration in years in which 
their income realization was high, or that they did not save up to experiment.  To 
explore, the fourth part of this paper calibrates the model allowing for buffer stock 
savings, and show that quantitatively, our model does not offer a fully satisfying 
explanation for the migration phenomena.  Once agents in our model are allowed 
to save up to migrate, the level of risk aversion required to quantitatively account 
for our data appears to be implausibly high.  This leads us to consider departures 
from full information and rationality and other market imperfections (such as 
savings constraints).  We conclude that our experiment demonstrates that the 
ingredients of subsistence, risk aversion and learning that we outline in our model 
are important parts of any story, but some other extension to this basic setup is 
required to fully account for the experimental results.  We therefore advocate care 
in interpreting our model: because we show that the model is not a complete 
description, any additional element that is needed to match the data may change 
or even reverse conclusions from our baseline model.  
The next two sections describe the context and the design of our 
interventions. We present results on program take-up and the effects of migration 
in Section 4. These findings motivate the risky experimentation model in Section 5. 
We use the model to frame further discussion of the data in Section 6, calibrate the 
model and discuss its ability to rationalize the experimental results in Section 7, 
discuss some extensions to the baseline model in Section 8 and offer conclusions 
and some tentative policy implications in Section 9. 
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2 The Context: Rangpur and the Monga Famine 
Our experiments were conducted in 100 villages in two districts (Kurigram and 
Lalmonirhat) in the seasonal-famine prone Rangpur region of north-western 
Bangladesh. The Rangpur region is home to roughly 7% of the country’s 
population, or 9.6 million people.  57% of the region’s population (or 5.3 million 
people) live below the poverty line.6  In addition to the higher level of poverty 
compared to the rest of Bangladesh, the Rangpur region experiences more 
pronounced seasonality in income and consumption, with incomes decreasing by 
50-60% and total household expenditures dropping by 10-25% during the post-
planting and pre-harvest season (September-November) for the main Aman rice 
crop (Khandker & Mahmud, 2012).  As Figure 1 indicates, the price of rice also 
spikes during this season, particularly in Rangpur, and thus actual rice 
consumption drops 22% even as households shift monetary expenditures towards 
food while waiting for the Aman rice harvest. 
The lack of job opportunities and low wages during the pre-harvest season 
and the coincident increase in grain prices combines to create a situation of 
seasonal deprivation and famine (Sen, 1981; Khandker & Mahmud, 2012).7  The 
famine occurs with disturbing regularity and thus has a name: monga. It has been 
described as a routine crisis (Rahman, 1995), and its effects on hunger and 
starvation are widely chronicled in the local media. The drastic drop in purchasing 
power between planting and harvest threatens to take consumption below 
subsistence for Rangpur households, where agricultural wages are already the 
lowest in the country (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 
6 Extreme poverty rates (defined as individuals who cannot meet the 2100 calorie per day food intake) were 
25 percent nationwide, but 43 percent in the Rangpur districts. Poverty figures are based on Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS) Household Income and expenditure survey 2005 (HIES 2005), and population figures 
are based on projections from the 2001 Census data. 
7 Amartya Sen (1981) notes these price spikes and wage plunges as important causes of the 1974 famine in 
Bangladesh, and that the greater Rangpur districts were among the most severely affected by this famine. 
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Several puzzling stylized facts about institutional characteristics and coping 
strategies motivate the design of our migration experiments. First, seasonal out-
migration from the monga-prone districts appears to be low despite the absence of 
local non-farm employment opportunities. According to the nationally 
representative HIES 2005 data, it is more common for agricultural laborers from 
other regions of Bangladesh to migrate in search of higher wages and employment 
opportunities.  Seasonal migration is known to be one primary mechanism by 
which households diversify income sources in India (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007). 
Second, inter-regional variation in income and poverty between Rangpur 
and the rest of the Bangladesh have been shown to be much larger than the inter-
seasonal variation within Rangpur (Khandker, 2012). This suggests smoothing 
strategies that take advantage of inter-regional arbitrage opportunities (i.e. 
migration) rather than inter-seasonal variation (e.g. savings, credit) may hold 
greater promise. Moreover, an in-depth case-study of monga (Zug, 2006) notes that 
there are off-farm employment opportunities in rickshaw-pulling and construction 
in nearby urban areas during the monga season. To be sure, Zug (2006) points out 
that this is a risky proposition for many, as labor demand and wages drop all over 
rice-growing Bangladesh during that season. However, this seasonality is less 
pronounced than that observed in Rangpur (Khandker, 2012). 
Finally, both government and large NGO monga-mitigation efforts have 
concentrated on direct subsidy programs like free or highly-subsidized grain 
distribution (e.g. “Vulnerable Group Feeding,”), or food-for-work and targeted 
microcredit programs. These programs are expensive, and the stringent micro-
credit repayment schedule may itself keep households from engaging in profitable 
migration (Shonchoy, 2010). There are structural reasons associated with rice 
production seasonality for the seasonal unemployment in Rangpur, and thus 
encouraging seasonal migration towards where there are jobs appears to be a 
sensible complementary policy to experiment with. 
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3 The Experiment and the Data Collected 
The two districts where the project was conducted (Lalmonirhat and Kurigram) 
represent the agro-ecological zones that regularly witness the monga famine. We 
randomly selected 100 villages in these two districts and first conducted a village 
census in each location in June 2008. Next we randomly selected 19 households in 
each village from the set of households that reported (a) that they owned less than 
50 decimals of land, and (b) that a household member was forced to miss meals 
during the prior (2007) monga season.8  In August 2008 we randomly allocated the 
100 villages into four groups: Cash, Credit, Information and Control. These 
treatments were subsequently implemented on the 19 households in each village in 
collaboration with PKSF through their partner NGOs with substantial field 
presence in the two districts.9  The partner NGOs were already implementing 
micro-credit programs in each of the 100 sample villages. 
The NGOs implemented the interventions in late August 2008 for the 
monga season starting in September. 16 of the 100 study villages (consisting of 304 
sample households) were randomly assigned to form a control group. A further 16 
villages (consisting of another 304 sample households) were placed in a job 
information only treatment. These households were given information on types of 
jobs available in four pre-selected destinations, the likelihood of getting such a job 
and approximate wages associated with each type of job and destination (see 
Appendix 1 for details). 703 households in 37 randomly selected villages were 
offered cash of 600 Taka (~US$8.50) at the origin conditional on migration, and an 
additional bonus of 200 Taka (~US$3) if the migrant reported to us at the 
destination during a specified time period.  We also provided exactly the same 
8 71% of the census households owned less than 50 decimals of land, and 63% responded affirmatively to 
the question about missing meals. Overall, 56% satisfied both criteria, and our sample is therefore 
representative of the poorer 56% of the rural population in the two districts. 
9 PKSF (Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation) is an apex micro-credit funding and capacity building 
organizations in Bangladesh. It is a not-for-profit set up by the Government of Bangladesh in 1990. 
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information about jobs and wages to this group as in the information-only 
treatment.  600 Taka covers a little more than the average round-trip cost of safe 
travel from the two origin districts to the four nearby towns for which we 
provided job information.  We monitored migration behavior carefully and strictly 
imposed the migration conditionality, so that the 600 Taka intervention was 
practically equivalent to providing a bus ticket.10  
The 589 households in the final set of 31 villages were offered the same 
information and the same Tk 600 + Tk 200 incentive to migrate, but in the form of a 
zero-interest loan to be paid back at the end of the monga season.  The loan was 
offered by our partner micro-credit NGOs that have a history of lending money in 
these villages.  There is an implicit understanding of limited liability on these loans 
since we are lending to the extremely poor during a period of financial hardship. 
As discussed below, ultimately 80% of households were able to repay the loan. 
In the 68 villages where we provided monetary incentives for people to 
seasonally out-migrate (37 cash + 31 credit villages), we sometimes randomly 
assigned additional conditionalities to subsets of households within the village.  A 
trial profile in Figure 2 provides details.  Some households were required to 
migrate in groups, and some were required to migrate to a specific destination.  
These conditionalities created random within-village variation, which we will use 
as instrumental variables to study spillover effects from one person to another. 
3.1 Data 
We conducted a baseline survey of the 1900 sample households in July 2008, just 
before the onset of the 2008 Monga.  We collected follow-up data in December 
10 The strict imposition of the migration conditionality implied that some households had to return the 600 
Taka if they did not migrate after accepting the cash. We could not provide an actual bus ticket (rather than 
cash to buy it) for practical reasons: if that specific bus crashed, then that would have reflected poorly on the 
NGOs.  Our data show that households found cheaper ways to travel to the destination: the average roundtrip 
travel cost was reported to be 450 Taka. The 150 Taka saving can cover about 5 days of food expenditure for 
one person at the origin.   
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2008, at the end of the 2008 Monga season.  These two rounds involved detailed 
consumption modules in addition to data on income, assets, credit and savings.  
The follow-up also asked detailed questions about migration experiences over the 
previous four months.  We learnt that many migrants had not returned by 
December 2008, and therefore conducted a short follow-up survey in May 2009 to 
get more complete information about households’ migration experiences.  To 
study the longer-run effects of migration, and re-migration behavior during the 
next Monga season, we conducted another follow-up survey in December 2009.  
This survey only included the consumption module and a migration module.   We 
conducted a new round of experiments to test our theories in 2011, and therefore 
collected an additional round of follow-up data on the re-migration behavior of 
this sample in July 2011. In summary, detailed consumption data was collected 
over 3 rounds: in July 2008 (baseline), December 2008 and December 2009. 
Migration behavior was collected in December 2008, May 2009, December 2009 and 
July 2011, which jointly cover three seasons in 2008, 2009 and 2011. 
Table 1 shows that there was pre-treatment balance across the randomly 
assigned groups in terms of the variables that we will use as outcomes in the 
analysis to follow.  A Bonferroni multiple comparison correction for 27 
independent tests requires a significance threshold of α=0.0019 for each test to 
recover an overall significance level of α=0.05.  Using this criterion, no differences 
at baseline are statistically meaningful. 
4 Program Take-up and the Effects of Seasonal Migration 
In this section we describe the main results of our initial (2008) experiment.  
Section 4.1 provides results on migration behavior.  We first document the impact 
of the incentive on migration during the 2008 monga season (the season for which 
the incentive was in place).  We then document the ongoing impact of the incentive 
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on migration in 2009 and 2011 (one and 3 years, respectively, after the incentive 
was removed).  In Section 4.2 we look at the effect of the treatment on consumption 
at the origin (both in the short-run: 2008 and the long-run: 2009).  We first provide 
both intent-to-treat and LATE estimates for consumption in December 2008 and 
then also look at the ongoing impact of the incentives on consumption in 2009.  In 
Section 4.3 we look at migration income and savings at the destination. 
4.1 Migration and Re-migration 
Table 2 reports the take-up of the program across the four groups labeled cash, 
credit, information and control.  We have 2008 migration data from two follow-up 
surveys, one conducted immediately after the monga ended (in December 2008), 
and another in May 2009.  The second follow-up was helpful for cross-checking the 
first migration report,11 and for capturing the migration experiences of those who 
left and/or returned later.  The two sets of reports were quite consistent with each 
other, and Table 2 shows the more complete migration rates obtained in May 2009.   
In Table 2 we define a household as having a seasonal migrant if at least one 
household member migrated away in search of work between September 2008 and 
April 2009. This extended definition of the migration window accounts for the 
possibility that our incentive merely moved forward migration that would have 
taken place anyway.  This window captures all migration during the Aman 
cropping season and, as a consequence, all the migration associated with Monga.    
About a third (36.0%) of households in control villages sent a seasonal 
migrant.12  Providing information about wages and job opportunities at the 
11 Since an incentive was involved, we verified migration reports closely using the substantial field presence 
of our partner NGOs, by cross-checking migration dates in the two surveys conducted six months apart, by 
cross-checking responses across households who reported migrating together in a group, and finally, by 
independently asking neighbors.  The analysis (available on request) shows a high degree of accuracy in the 
cross reports and, importantly, that the accuracy of the cross reporting was not different in incentivized 
villages.    
12 In a large survey of 482,000 households in the Rangpur region, 36.0% of people report using “out-
migration” as a coping mechanism for the Monga (Khandker et al., 2011).  Our result appears very consistent 
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destination had no effect on the migration rate (the point estimate of the difference 
is 0.0% and is tightly estimated).  Either households already had the information 
that we made available to them, or the information we made available was not 
useful or credible.  With the $8.50 (+$3) cash or credit treatments, the seasonal 
migration rate jumps to 59.0% and 56.8% respectively.  In other words, incentives 
induced about 22% of the sample households to send a migrant.  The migration 
response to the cash and credit incentives are statistically significant relative to 
control or information, but there is no statistical difference between providing cash 
and providing credit – a fact that our model will later account for.  Since 
households appear to react very similarly to either incentive, we combine the 
impact of these two treatments for expositional simplicity (and call it “incentive”) 
for much of our analysis, and compare it against the combined information and 
control groups (labeled “non-incentive”). 
The lower panel of Table 2 compares re-migration rates in subsequent years 
across the incentive and non-incentive groups.  We conducted follow-up surveys 
in December 2009 and in July 2011 and asked about migration behavior in the 
preceding lean seasons, but we did not repeat any of the treatments in the villages 
used for the comparisons in the top half of Table 2.  Strikingly, the migration rate 
in 2009 was 10 percentage points higher in treatment villages, and this is after the 
incentives were removed.  Section 6.3.1 will show that this is almost entirely due to 
(a subset of) migrants who were induced in 2008 re-migrating.  In other words, 
migration appears to be an “experience good”.    The July 2011 survey measured 
migration during the other (lesser) lean season that coincides with the pre-harvest 
period for the second (lesser) rice harvest. Even two and a half years later, without 
any further incentive, the migration rate remains 8% higher in the villages 
with the large-sample finding.  Interestingly, survey respondents who qualified for government safety-net 
benefits were no more likely to migrate than households that did not.  
 12 
                                                                                                                                                    
randomly assigned to the cash or credit treatment in 2008.13  The re-migration rates 
in 2009 and 2011 were significantly higher (relative to control) in the cash and 
credit groups separately.  
We learn two important things from this re-migration behavior.  First, the 
propensity to re-migrate absent further inducements serves as a revealed 
preference indication that the net benefits from migration were positive for many, 
and/or that migrants developed some asset during the initial experience that 
makes future migration a positive expected return activity.14  Second, the 
persistence of re-migration from 2009 to 2011 (without much further decay after 
the four potential migration seasons in between) suggests that households learnt 
something valuable or grew some real asset from the initial migration experience.  
This persistence makes it unlikely that some households simply got lucky one year, 
and then it took them several tries to determine (again) that they are actually better 
off not migrating.  It also reduces the likelihood that our results are driven by a 
particularly good migration year in 2008.   
This strong repeat migration also suggests that migration is an absorbing 
state, at least for some portion of the population.  As we discuss further in Sections 
6 and 8 this makes it hard to understand how our initial incentive was successful in 
inducing so much migration. 
4.2 Effects of Migration on Consumption at the Origin 
We now study the effects of migration on consumption expenditures amongst 
remaining household members during the monga season. Consumption is a broad 
13 Overall in our sample, 953 out of 1871 sample households sent a migrant in 2008 (and 723 of them 
traveled before our December 2008 follow-up survey), and 800 households sent a seasonal migrant during the 
2009 monga season.  The overall migration rate in 2011 was 40.8%. 
14 All socio-economic outcomes we measure using our surveys will necessarily be incomplete, since it is not 
possible to combine the social, psychological and economic effects of migration in one comprehensive welfare 
measure.  The revealed re-migration preference is therefore a useful complement to other economic outcomes 
that we use in the analysis below. 
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and useful measure of the benefits of migration, aggregating as it does the impact 
of migrating on the whole family (Deaton, 1997), and takes into account the 
monetary costs of investing (although it neglects non-pecuniary costs).  
Consumption can be comparably measured for migrant and non-migrant families 
alike, and it overcomes the problems associated with measuring the full costs and 
benefits of technology adoption highlighted in Foster and Rosenzweig (2010).  Our 
consumption data are detailed and comprehensive: we collect expenditures on 318 
different food (255) and non-food (63) items (mostly over a week recall, and some 
less-frequently-purchased items over bi-weekly or monthly recall), and aggregate 
up to create measures of food and non-food consumption and caloric intake.   
We first present pure experimental (intent-to-treat) estimates in Table 3 with 
consumption measures regressed on the randomly assigned treatments: cash, 
credit and information for migration.   Our regressions take the form 
 𝑌𝑖𝑣𝑗 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑣𝑗 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑗 +  𝜑𝑗 +  𝜐𝑖𝑣𝑗  
whereYivj is per capita consumption (money spent on food, non-food, total calories, 
protein, meat, education, etc in turn) for household i in village v in sub-district j in 
2008, and , φj are fixed effects for sub-districts.  Standard errors are clustered by 
village, which was the unit of randomization (and this will be true for all our 
analysis). The first three columns in Table 3 show ?̂?1, ?̂?2 and ?̂?3 – the coefficients on 
cash, credit and information – and each row represents a different regression on a 
different dependent variable.  The dependent variables are household averages 
using the set of people reported to be living in the household for at least 7 days at 
the time of the survey as the denominator.  We discuss the appropriate choice of 
denominator in more detail below.   
Both the cash and credit treatments – which induced 21-24% more migration 
– result in statistically significant increases in food and non-food consumption. 
Consumption of food and non-food items increased by about 97 Taka per 
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household member per month in the ‘cash’ villages, which represents about a 10% 
increase over consumption in the control group.  The increase in credit villages 
was 8%.  The information treatment, which did not induce any additional 
migration, does not result in any significant increases in consumption. Calories per 
person per day increase by 106 under the ‘cash’ treatment, and consumption of 
protein increases significantly, especially from meat and fish.  For the Bangladesh 
context, this reflects a shift towards a higher quality diet, as meat and fish are 
considered more attractive, “tasty” sources of protein.  Educational expenditures 
on children also increase significantly. 
Since both cash and credit treatments led to greater migration (Table 2), 
column 4 reports the intent-to-treat estimates for these two incentive treatments 
jointly. Average monthly household consumption increases by 68 Taka in these 
incentive villages (7% over control group), and this results in 142 extra calories per 
person per day. Column 5 indicates that these effects are generally robust to 
adding some controls for baseline characteristics. 
Next we show the local average treatment effect (LATE), the consumption 
effect of migration for those households that were induced to migrate by our 
intervention.  This is a well-defined and policy relevant parameter in our setting: 
programs providing credit for migration and even incentivizing migration seem to 
be of direct policy interest, and we think it unlikely that any households were 
dissuaded from migrating by our incentive.  We calculate this effect by estimating:  𝑌𝑖𝑣𝑗 = 𝛼 +  𝛽 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑗 +  𝜃 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑗 +  𝜑𝑗 +  𝜐𝑖𝑣𝑗 
where Migrantivj  is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one member of household 
migrated during Monga in 2008 and 0 otherwise, and Xivj is a vector of household 
characteristics at baseline that we sometime control for.  The endogenous choice to 
migrate is instrumented with whether or not a household was randomly placed in 
the incentive group: 
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 𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑗 =  𝜆 +  𝜌 𝑍𝑣 + 𝛾 𝑋𝑖𝑣𝑗 + 𝜑𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑣𝑗  
where the set of instruments Zv  includes indicators for the random assignment at 
the village level into one of the treatment (cash or credit) or control groups.  First 
stage results in Appendix Table 1 verify that the random assignments to cash or 
credit treatments are powerful predictors of the decision to migrate.   
The intervention may have changed not only households’ propensity to 
migrate on the extensive margin, but also who within the household migrates, how 
long they travel, the number of migration episodes on the intensive margin.  Such 
changes may affect the interpretation of the IV estimates. Appendix Table 2 shows 
that the treatment does not significantly alter whether the household sends a male 
or female migrant, or the number of trips per migrant, or the number of migrants 
or trips per household (on the intensive margin, conditional on someone in the 
household migrating once).  The effects are concentrated on the extensive margin, 
inducing migration among households who were previously not migrating at all.15  
However, the treatment does make it more likely that older, heads of households 
become more likely to migrate.        
 IV estimates using treatment assignment are always larger than OLS 
estimates.  This likely reflects the fact that rich households at the upper end of our 
sample income distribution are not very likely to migrate (income has a negative 
coefficient in the first stage regression in Appendix Table 1).  In the IV 
specification, per capita food, non-food expenditures, and caloric intake among 
induced migrant households increase by 30% to 35% relative to non-migrant 
households.  This is very similar to the 36% consumption gains from migration 
estimated by Beegle et al (2011) for Tanzania. Finally, none of the results discussed 
above are sensitive to changes in baseline control variables.  
15 The migrant is almost always male (97%), and often the household head (84% in treatment villages and 
76% in control), who is often the only migrant from that household (93%).  Migrants make 1.73 trips on 
average during the season, which implies that migrants often travel multiple times within the season.  The first 
trip lasts 42 (56) days for treatment (control) group migrants. They return home with remittance and to rest, 
and travel again for 40 (40) days or less on any subsequent trips. 
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In terms of magnitude of effects, monthly consumption among migrant 
families increase by about $5 per person, or $20 per household due to induced 
migration.   Our survey only asked about expenditures during the second month 
of monga, and the modal migrant in our sample had not yet returned home (which 
includes cases where they may have returned once, but left again).  We therefore 
expect the effects to persist for at least another month, and the total expenditure 
increase therefore easily exceeds the amount of the treatment ($8.50).  Furthermore, 
if households engage in consumption smoothing, then some benefits may persist 
even further in the future.  In any case, the $8.50 is spent two months prior to the 
consumption survey on transportation costs. 
It is not straightforward to evaluate the returns to migration based on these 
estimates, and the precise value will depend on assumptions about the period over 
which the consumption gains are realized, and how to treat the cost that some 
migrants choose to incur to return home and take a second trip.  Under a 
reasonable assumption that the consumption gains are realized over the 2 months 
of the monga period, households consume an extra Tk. 2840 (Tk. 355 per capita per 
month estimated in Table 3 * 4 household members * 2 months) during the monga 
by incurring a migration costs of Tk. 1038 (Tk.600/trip*1.73 trips).  This implies a 
gross return of 273%, ignoring any disutility from separation.      
Since the act of migration increases both the independent variable of interest 
and possibly reduces the denominator of the dependent variable (household size at 
the time of interview), any measurement error in the date that migrants report 
returning can bias the coefficient on migration upwards. We address this problem 
directly by studying the effects of migration in 2008 on consumption in 2009 
(where household size is computed using a totally different survey conducted over 
a year later).  Table 4 shows that 2009 effects are about 60-75% as large as the 
consumption effects in 2008 across both ITT and LATE specifications, but still 
statistically significant.  Migration is associated with a 28% increase in total 
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household consumption which is still substantial.  The LATE specification for 2009 
is more difficult to interpret: many of those induced to migrate in 2008 were 
induced to re-migrate a year later, but they could have also re-invested their 2008 
earnings in other ways that leads to long-run consumption gains.  
Since the migration decision is serially correlated, measurement error in 
2009 migration dates can also bias our estimates. We therefore conduct a number 
of other sensitivity checks on the consumption results by varying the definition of 
household size (the denominator).  These results are shown in Appendix Table 3.  
We conservatively assume that household members present in the house on the 
day of the interview were present for the entire prior month to consume the 
reported expenditures, since this variable is least likely to suffer from 
measurement error and coding problems.  We compute this household size based 
on different questions in the survey (“who currently lives in the household” as 
opposed to “who is present on the interview date”).  Both ITT and IV results 
remain statistically significant, but slightly smaller (e.g. 130 or 125 calories rather 
than 142) in some specifications.  Finally, even with the very conservative 
assumption that migrants never left, migration is estimated to increase 
consumption by 1169 calories per household (or 292 calories per person) per day in 
the IV or 194 calories per household per day in the ITT.  However, this last result, 
shown in panel E, is no longer statistically significant. 
4.3 Income and Savings at the Destination 
Next we examine the data on migrants’ earnings and savings at the destination to 
see whether the magnitude of consumption gains we observe at the origin are in 
line with the amount migrants earn, save and remit.  Information on earnings and 
savings at the destination were only collected from migrants (non-migrants 
skipped over this section of the survey), and these are not experimental estimates; 
they merely help to calibrate the consumption results.  Table 5 shows that migrants 
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in the treatment group earn about $105 (7451 Taka) on average and save about half 
of that.  The average savings plus remittance is about a dollar a day.  Remitting 
money is difficult and migrants carry money back in person, which is partly why 
we observe multiple migration episodes during the same lean season.  Therefore, 
joint savings plus remittances is the best available indicator of money that becomes 
available for consumption at the origin.  The destination data suggest that this 
amount is about $66 (4600 Taka) for the season.  The “regular” migrants in the 
control group earn more per episode, save and remit more per day relative to 
migrants in the treatment group.  This is understandable, since the migrants we 
induce are new and relatively inexperienced in this activity.   
We can compute experimental (ITT) estimates on total income (and 
savings), by aggregating across all income sources at the origin and the 
destination. Income is notoriously difficult to measure in these settings, with 
income realized from various sources – agricultural wages, crop income, livestock 
income, enterprise profits – parts of which are derived from self-employment or 
family employment where a financial transaction may not have occurred. 
Appendix Table 4 shows ITT and IV estimates. Households in the treatment group 
have 585 extra Taka in earnings, and hold 592 extra Taka in savings.  In the IV 
specification, migration is associated with 3300 extra Taka in earnings and savings. 
We also examine effects on an anthropometric measure we collected – each child’s 
middle-upper-arm-circumference (MUAC).  The IV specifications suggest that 
migrants’ children’s MUAC grew an extra 5-11 mm, but the result is not 
statistically significant. MUAC was measured in December 2008, soon after the 
initial inducement to migrate.        
Table 6 is a purely descriptive table that breaks down the number of 
migration episodes and average earnings by sector and by destination.  Dhaka (the 
largest urban area) is the most popular migration destination, and a large fraction 
of migrants to Dhaka work in the transport sector (i.e. rickshaw pulling).  Many 
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others work for a daily wage, often as unskilled labor at construction sites.  At or 
around other smaller towns that are nearer to Rangpur, many migrants work in 
agriculture, especially in potato-growing areas that follow a different seasonal crop 
cycle than in rice-growing Rangpur.  Migrants earn the most in Dhaka and at other 
“non-agricultural destinations”: about 5100 Taka or $71 per migration episode, 
which translates to $121 per household on average given multiple trips.  Those 
working for daily wages in the non-agricultural sector (e.g. construction sites, brick 
kilns) earn the most.     
It is difficult to infer the income these migrants would have received had they 
not migrated.  Observed average migrant earnings at the destination (100 Taka per 
day) do compare favorably to the earnings of the sub-sample of non-migrants with 
salaried employment at the origin (65 Taka per day) and to the profits of 
entrepreneurs at the origin (61 Taka per day).  There is heterogeneity around that 
average, which introduces some risk, and we will discuss this in Section 6.  
5 Theory 
In this section we develop a simple model that is inspired by the three key facts we 
documented above: (1) A large number of households were motivated to migrate 
in response to the 600 Taka incentive, (2) There were positive returns to the 
induced migration on average, indicating that households were not migrating 
despite a positive expected profit, and (3) A large portion of the households that 
were incentivized to migrate continued to send a seasonal migrant in subsequent 
years.  Given the first two facts, our model incorporates both risk aversion and a 
credit constraint.  Furthermore, any attempt to identify the frictions that prevent 
households from engaging in an apparently beneficial activity will have to 
confront the possibility that households could save up to migrate. We therefore 
allow for savings, both for migration and to buffer against income shocks.    
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We first use the model to frame a deeper discussion of the data in Section 6. 
We will show several patterns in the data are qualitatively consistent with our 
simple framework.  Second, Section 7 will ask whether the model can make sense 
of the data, quantitatively. To do this, we calibrate the model and then ask how 
risk averse a potential migrant would have to be for our model to generate our 
experimental results.   
5.1 Baseline Model 
We consider the migration and consumption choices of an infinitely lived 
household in discrete time. In each time period, a state of the world 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 is drawn 
according to the distribution μ and the household receives income ys.16 We refer to 
this as background income and assume the process is iid.17 A household that enters 
the period with assets A and receives background income y has cash on hand x = 
A+y. We assume that the household can save at a gross interest rate R, but cannot 
borrow for consumption purposes.18  Therefore, consumption is less than cash on 
hand (𝑐 ≤ 𝑥) in any period. 
The household is uncertain about whether it will be good at migrating. With 
probability 𝜋𝐺  the household is type G – good at migrating – and receives a 
16 We assume that all households face the same distribution of background income.  This is a strong 
simplifying assumption.  In practice there are likely to be poorer and wealthier households.  Our model 
suggests that those that are very poor will not migrate because it is too risky.  Those that are very rich will 
likely not migrate because they do not need to supplement income and those that are in the middle migrate 
because they can afford to and benefit from doing so.  This is consistent with a slightly altered version of the 
model presented here in which migration truncates the distribution of earning from below.  We have explored 
this alternative model, but find that it leads to similar quantitative results.  We do not pursue this approach in 
the main text as the model is more complicated – because cash on hand is not a sufficient state variable it is 
also more computationally expensive to use for simulations. 
17 See Deaton (1991) for a discussion of the impact of relaxing this assumption. We think it is a reasonable 
assumption in our setting and maintain it throughout. 
18 Households have access to microfinance from a range of sources, however, we believe limitations on 
microfinance borrowing imply that we should think of these households as credit constrained.  First, most 
lending is specifically for women and specifically for entrepreneurial activity.  To the extent these requirement 
are binding, microfinance is not useful for consumption smoothing or migration.  Second, typical credit 
contracts require borrowing on a set loan schedule and require immediate repayment.  Again, this means 
microfinance is very hard to use for smoothing or migration. 
 21 
                                                 
positive (net) return to migrating of m. With probability (1 − 𝜋𝐺) the household is 
type B – bad at migrating – and receives no return to migrating, but faces a cost F if 
it does choose to migrate. We think of type as being a household specific 
parameter, and not something that can be easily learned or transferred over from 
other households in the village. We further assume that this uncertainty resolves 
after one period of experimentation with migration. Migration is, therefore, to be 
thought of as an experience good.19 This assumption is motivated by reports that 
migrants need to find a potential employer at the destination and convince that 
employer to trust them.  Once this link is established it is permanent, but some 
migrants will not be able to form such a link.  A leading example from our data is 
convincing the owner of a rickshaw that you can be trusted with his valuable asset. 
Below, we discuss further reasons for modeling risk in this way. 
A household that knows it is bad at migrating will never migrate and is 
essentially a Deaton (1991) buffer stock saver. With cash on hand x, such a 
household solves  
𝐵(𝑥) = max
𝑐≤𝑥




where u is a standard strictly increasing, strictly concave utility function and δ is 
the household's discount factor. A household that knows it is good at migrating 
will always migrate and solves a similar problem, but with a higher income. With 








With this formulation we are assuming that the household can migrate before it 
19 We thank an anonymous referee for clarification on this point and also the term experience good. 
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makes its consumption decision, this means that a households that knows that it is 
a good migrator can always migrate regardless of credit constraints.  
We are interested in the behavior of a household that has never migrated 
before. In each period, such a household chooses both whether to migrate and 
consumption/savings. If it migrates it discovers that it is a good migrator with 
probability 𝜋𝐺  and has value G(x). If, however, the household migrates and 
discovers that it is a bad migrator, then it has paid a cost F and receives value B(x-
F).  We think of 𝜋𝐺  as the probability of finding a connection at the destination 
within a reasonable search time. We think of the cost F as being the cost of 
transport and lost income while the migrator searches for work. The household 
will choose to migrate if the expected utility of migration is greater than that of not 
migrating. Therefore, a household that has never migrated before, and has cash on 
hand x, solves  
 
𝑉(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 �𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐≤𝑥
�𝑢(𝑐) + 𝛿 � 𝑉�𝑦𝑠 + 𝑅(𝑥 − 𝑐)�𝑑𝜇(𝑠)
𝑆
� ,𝜋𝐺𝐺(𝑥)
+ (1 − 𝜋𝐺)𝐵(𝑥 − 𝐹)� .  
Migration is risky in this model. A household that turns out to be a bad migrator 
pays a cost F but receives no benefit.  This has two implications. First, the 
household is credit constrained and will have to forego consumption in the current 
period. Second, the household may face a bad shock in the next period, but will 
have no buffer stock saving to smooth consumption. Hence, the model has a role 
for background risk which, given the assumptions we make about the utility 
function, implies that the riskier the background income process, the less likely is 
migration for any particular level of cash on hand.20  
20 See Eeckhoudt et al. (1996) and the literature cited there for a discussion of when background risk leads to 
a reduction in risk taking. 
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Throughout our discussion we assume that the household faces a 
subsistence constraint. We model this by assuming that 𝑢(𝑐) = 𝑢�(𝑐 − 𝑠) with lim𝑥→0 𝑢�′(𝑥) = ∞, lim𝑥→0 𝑢�(𝑥) = −∞, and lim𝑥→0 𝑢�′′(𝑥)𝑢�′(𝑥) = ∞.  That is, there is a level 
of consumption s at which the household is unwilling to consider decreasing 
consumption for any reason, and the household becomes infinitely risk averse. We 
think of s as a point at which survival requires the household to spend all its 
current resources on food, with the implication that household members face a 
threat of serious illness or death if they do not consume at least s. The possibility 
that consumption is close to this point in our data is highlighted by the fact that the 
monga famine regularly claims lives. We also show below that many households’ 
expenditure seems to fall below what would be required for a minimal subsistence 
diet. We believe it reasonable to assume that a household that has such a low 
consumption level would not be willing to take on any risk. For our simulations 




The model is related to Deaton's buffer stock model, several models from 
the poverty trap literature (e.g. Banerjee, 2004), and the entrepreneurship literature 
(e.g. Buera, 2009; Vereshchagina & Hopenhayn, 2009). We now describe the 
behavior of agents in this model using the value functions, policy functions and 
simulated time series of choices. Figure 3 provides plots of two value functions, 
both for households that have never migrated before. The first function shows the 
value to a household that is forced to migrate in this period: 
 
𝑉𝑀(𝑥) = 𝜋𝐺𝐺(𝑥) + (1 − 𝜋𝐺)𝐵(𝑥 − 𝐹). 
 
The second function shows the value to a household that decides not to migrate in 









As is generally the case, 𝑉𝑀 crosses 𝑉𝑁 once from below. This implies a cutoff level 
of cash on hand 𝑥�: for cash on hand below 𝑥� the household does not migrate, for 
cash on hand greater than 𝑥� the household does migrate. Because the two value 
functions cross, the value V is not convex, which implies that the household would 
be risk loving at levels of cash on hand close to 𝑥�. We do not allow households any 
kind of randomization that would help them take advantage of this non-convexity 
– this is a feature of most poverty trap models. These issues are explored in detail 
in Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009). 
Our cash incentive treatment is easy to incorporate into the model: the 
payment increases cash on hand by 600 Taka in either the good or bad state of the 
world. This has the effect of moving 𝑉𝑀 up, lowering 𝑥� to 𝑥�′. Those households that 
had cash on hand in the interval [𝑥�′, 𝑥�] are induced to migrate.  Other interventions 
and policy prescriptions can be analyzed in a similar fashion. 
Figure 4 displays typical policy functions – consumption as a function of 
cash on hand – for the model. The first policy function shows consumption for a 
household that knows it is bad at migrating (𝑐𝐵), and the second for a household 
that has never migrated, but that we restrict to not migrate in the current period (𝑐𝑀). At low levels of cash on hand, both policy functions lie on the 45 degree line – 
the household spends all that it can. As cash on hand rises, the household that 
knows it is a bad migrator begins to buffer, consuming less than cash on hand and 
saving some money to smooth later consumption. This is the standard result 
following Deaton (1991). Initially, the household that can migrate does the same 
thing and the two policy functions lie on top of each other. As cash on hand 
approaches 𝑥�, however, 𝑐𝑀 falls below 𝑐𝐵: the household that can migrate begins to 
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save up for migration. Thus, the saving of a potential migrator can be divided into 
two parts: buffering, and saving up for migration.  The figure shows that, for some 
parameter values, consumption is not a monotone function of cash on hand, a 
result that is consistent with the findings of Buera (2009). As cash on hand rises 
past 𝑥�, 𝑐𝑀 continues to lie below 𝑐𝐵: we have constrained the household not to 
migrate in this period so it continues to save in the hope of migrating next period. 
Finally, there is a level of cash on hand past which 𝑐𝑀 > 𝑐𝐵 – the household that 
has never migrated knows that it can migrate next period and it is consequently 
richer (in expectation) than the household that knows it is bad at migrating.  
We are not interested in general results as 𝑡 → ∞ but rather in the behavior 
over real world time periods. This behavior is inherently stochastic and best 
understood by looking at simulations. Figure 5 shows simulations of cash on hand 
and consumption for two households with different starting levels of cash on hand 
(wealth).   Both households are assumed to be good migrators.  The panel on the 
left shows cash on hand and the right shows consumption.  The cash on hand 
simulation shows that the wealthier household quickly saves enough to cross the 
migration threshold, 𝑥�.  After crossing the threshold, cash on hand spikes as the 
household discovers that it is a good migrator.   The poorer household never 
migrates.  The consumption simulations shows that the wealthier households 
consumes less initially – as it saves up – but after crossing the migration threshold 
has a higher consumption level.  In general, our simulations show that households 
with a lower mean income �𝐸𝜇𝑦� or with a lower starting cash on hand are less 
likely to cross the threshold for any finite time period, indicating a kind of poverty 
trap. It is this poverty trap that can potentially explain our experimental results: a 
portion of households are stuck in a low income situation in which they cannot 
migrate, but a small intervention can push them to experiment with migration, 
with potentially high returns.  
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We can also use the model to consider other comparative statics. Risk 
aversion appears intuitively linked to aversion to experimentation, but the model 
suggests that the relationship is more complicated. Simulations show that an 
increase in risk aversion has three effects. First, increasing risk aversion increases 
the cost of experimenting with migration and tends to increase 𝑥� and thus reduce 
the propensity to migrate.  Second, as risk aversion increases, the return to 
migration increases because migration can be seen as a risk mitigation strategy.  
Third, for many utility functions (including the one we use for simulations), 
absolute prudence increases with risk aversion.21 As a consequence, as risk 
aversion increases the household engages in more buffer stock saving, implying 
that the household is more likely to cross any given threshold level of cash on 
hand. We have not sought a general characterization of which effect dominates, 
but do observe all three effects in our simulations. Similar effects apply to an 
increase in the riskiness of income. On the one hand a riskier income means more 
background risk and, therefore (for specific utility functions) effectively an increase 
in risk aversion. On the other hand, more risk means more buffer stock savings. 
6 Qualitative Evaluation of the Model’s Assumptions and 
Central Implications 
 
In this section we provide some descriptive and some experimental evidence in 
favor of the main assumptions and implications of the model. 
6.1 Descriptive Evidence on Income Variability and Buffering 
A key assumption of the model is that the income process is stochastic.  To verify 
whether this describes our setting, we study the inter-temporal variability in the 
21 The coefficient of absolute prudence is defined as 𝑢
′′′(𝑥)
𝑢′′(𝑥) . See Kimball (1990) for a definition of prudence 
and the relationship to precautionary savings and concepts of risk aversion including decreasing absolute risk 
aversion. 
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three rounds of consumption data collected at baseline (July 2008), December 2008 
and December 2009.  We conservatively use consumption data rather than income 
data because income is measured with more error in these settings (Deaton, 1997) 
and this would artificially inflate variability, and because income is more variable 
due to seasonality and consumption smoothing.   
Even with the conservative measure, we see that average variability in per-
capita consumption is high. Mean absolute deviation in weekly consumption in 
our sample is 307 Taka between rounds one and two and 368 Taka between rounds 
two and three. The standard deviation of the absolute deviation in income is 635 
and 508 Taka respectively. By way of comparison, average per-capita consumption 
levels in the control group were 1067, 954 and 1227 Taka in the three surveys. In 
Appendix Figure 1 we plot histograms of second round consumption separately 
for each of the 10 deciles of first round household consumption. Visual inspection 
suggests that there is no real permanence in the income distribution - those that 
were in the lowest decile in the first round do not appear to have a significantly 
different draw in the second period from those that were in the middle decile. We 
verify this by regressing consumption in later rounds on in earlier rounds 
consumption in Appendix Table 5.  Every extra dollar of consumption measured in 
July 2008 is associated with only 10.2 cents extra consumption in December 2008, 
and 6.7 cents in December 2009.  One dollar extra in December 2008 is associated 
with 45 cents more consumption in December 2009. The R-squared in these 
regressions are between 0.02-0.13: current consumption does not predict future 
consumption well.   Although measurement error is probably very important in 
explaining these results, we think it is reasonable to conclude that background 
income is also very variable. 
The reported yearly variation in income and consumption dwarfs the size of 
our 600 Taka incentive, and thereby poses a significant challenge to the model’s 
ability to rationalize the data. Our model suggests a cutoff point of cash on hand 
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that would trigger migration. Our incentive presumably works, in part, by 
increasing cash on hand. But, the data suggests that income (and, therefore, cash 
on hand) will be higher by the size of the incentive regularly, just by pure chance.   
This fact is primarily why we do not think that a pure liquidity constraint – the 
complete inability to raise the bus fare – provides a good description of the setting.  
We return to this issue below. 
Background risk also has important implications for behavior.  If 
households are prudent (i.e. 𝑢′′′ > 0) and impatient (𝛿 > 𝑅), both of which seem 
likely in our setting,22 then high income-variability should lead to buffer stock 
savings.  Appendix Table 6 describes savings behavior in our sample. Although 
our households are poor, they have a reasonably high level of savings. Conditional 
on being a saver, the mean holding in cash is 1400 Taka, which is about 35% of 
monthly expenditure for the household. This is a relatively high 
savings/expenditure ratio, even compared to the United States.  For the full 
sample (not conditioning on people with positive savings), average cash savings is 
745 Taka, and average value of cash plus other liquid assets (e.g. jewelry and 
financial assets) held by all households is 1085 Taka.  This level of savings is not 
inconsistent with the observation that households in our sample are often close to 
subsistence. Buffering implies that in each period some households will have zero 
savings and be consuming hand to mouth, but those same households will have 
high savings in other periods. Indeed, the data bears this out quite well. 53% of 
households held cash savings at baseline, and this fraction varies a lot across 
rounds (57% in December 2008 and 34% in June 2011).  The share of households 
holding liquid assets varies from 42% to 59% to 81%.  The standard deviation of 
savings is also about two times mean savings which is consistent with savings 
being variable, as it would be in a buffer stock model. 
22 The existence of savings constraints in developing countries (Dupas & Robinson, 2013a) makes 𝛿 > 𝑅 
reasonable. There are by now many theoretical and empirical arguments suggesting that prudence is a 
reasonable assumption for the utility function. 
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6.2 Descriptive and Experimental Evidence on Migration Risk 
Our model assumes both that migration is risky, and that risk takes a particular 
form: risk is assumed to be idiosyncratic.  We begin by discussing evidence on 
migration risk, and will turn to the specific form of the risk in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.  
Figure 6 provides a clear depiction of the migration risk.  We take the 
monthly consumption per household member in December 2008, and subtract the 
value of the incentive from households that chose to take it.  This gives a measure 
of the possible outcome if the cost of migration had to be born within one month 
by the household, not subsidized by our incentive program.  In panel A, we 
subtract the histogram for distribution of consumption in the control (non-
incentive) villages from this histogram for the distribution of consumption in the 
treatment (incentive) villages, less the value of the migration incentive paid out.  
The results show significant amounts of risk: while the treatment moved many 
poor households from extreme poverty (consuming 500-900 Taka per month) to a 
less poor (1300 Taka per month) category, many other households would shift to 
100-300 Taka per month (which, as discussed below, corresponds to caloric intake 
at or below subsistence) without the payment to migrate.  Panel B shows that the 
risk disappears when we account for the program’s migration incentive payment 
for those who took the money.  This suggests that households at greatest risk were 
the ones induced to migrate by our incentive, a result we will explore more 
precisely below by creating a measure of subsistence.    
6.2.1 Experiments on Migration Insurance 
Motivated by our first two years of findings and the model, we also designed a 
new experiment to directly test whether households perceive migration to be risky.   
We returned to our sample villages in 2011 and offered a new set of treatments.  
Appendix 2 describes the sampling frame and intervention design. To study risk, 
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the specific treatment was to offer a 800 Taka loan up-front conditional on 
migration, but the loan repayment requirement is explicitly conditional on 
measured rainfall conditions.  Excessive rainfall is an important external event that 
adversely affects labor demand and work opportunities at the destination. Rain 
makes it more difficult to engage in skilled wage work at outdoor construction 
sites (e.g. breaking bricks), it both increases the cost of pulling rickshaws and lower 
the demand for a rickshaw transport.   In terms of the model above, we think of 
high rainfall as reducing the likelihood of finding a connection at the destination 
(because job opportunities that allow you to display your skills to a potential 
employer are scarce), as well as reducing the return to migration, m. 
Appendix 3 develops a simple model of index insurance with basis risk to 
clarify how this treatment is linked to household perceptions of migration risk.  
Following Clarke (2011), we formalize basis risk as the probability that income is 
low, but that rainfall is also low, so that the insurance does not pay out.  In terms of 
the above model, this would be the event of not finding a job connection during 
your search (i.e. finding out you are a bad migrator) but still being forced to repay 
the loan.  Appendix 3 shows that our formalization implies that the portion of 
people induced to migrate by the index insurance is decreasing in basis risk, if and 
only if migration is risky and households are risky averse. We assume that 
households that migrate to Bogra face lower basis risk, and farmers, for whom 
high rainfall is usually beneficial, face greater basis risk.23  
Table 7 shows results of regressing the 2011 migration rate on our 2011 
treatments, and interactions of the insurance treatment with an indicator for 
previous migration to Bogra, and an indicator for farmers.  Column (1) shows that 
the rainfall insurance contract induced migration, and that the effect is similar in 
size as the effect of the simple (conditional) credit contract.  Columns (2) and (3) 
23 We use the basis risk variation to test for riskiness because our insurance is valuable even without risk, 
because also includes a credit element. 
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show that those with a propensity to travel to Bogra (i.e. lower basis risk) are more 
affected by the insurance, while farmers (greater basis risk) find the insurance 
contract less appealing. The farmer-insurance interaction is statistically significant 
with 99% confidence, but the Bogra interaction is not significant at conventional 
levels.  Finally, column (4) shows that when we control for farmers, the Bogra 
effect is much stronger (p-value of 0.15).  For non-farming households who had a 
preference for Bogra, the rainfall insurance contract induces 45% more migration in 
2011.  We see this set of results as reasonable strong evidence in favor of our 
assumption that migration is risky, and households behave as though they are risk 
averse. 
6.3 Learning and Idiosyncratic Risk 
Our model makes the assumption that migration risk takes a specific form: that it 
is individual-specific (idiosyncractic), and resolved after one period of migration 
(i.e, there is something to learn, or a connection to make.).  Our motivation for 
making this assumption is the strong and consistent repeat migration seen in the 
data – half of all induced migrants migrate again, and this number is stable over 3 
years. This result is very hard to drive without learning or accumulation of a 
connection. Even if households earn a very large return on the investment F, the 
impact will dissipate quickly because of the variability in base income.  
6.3.1 Is Risk Idiosyncratic in this Setting?  
We first examine whether migration risk is idiosyncratic, and try to identify the 
nature of the risk from our data, before turning to evidence on learning. Our 
information intervention – which provided general information on wages and the 
likelihood of finding a job – has a precisely estimated zero impact on migration 
rates. This is consistent with the assumption that risk is idiosyncratic, but may also 
reflect the fact that this kind of information is not credible.  
 32 
We next examine the determinants of 2009 re-migration to study directly 
whether households are able to learn from others.  As discussed above, our 2008 
experiments contained several sub-treatments where additional conditions were 
imposed: some households were required to migrate to specific destinations, some 
were required to form groups, etc.  This variation is within village and implies that 
we have exogenous variation in the number of a household’s friends that migrated.  
We also collected data at baseline on social relationships between all our sample 
households to identify friends and relatives within the village.  To test for learning 
we run regressions of the form 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑖 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖  
where 𝑦𝑖 is an indicator for second round migration, 𝑀𝑖 is an indicator for first 
round migration and 𝐹𝑖 is a measure of how many of a household’s friends 
migrated. We instrument 𝑀𝑖 and 𝐹𝑖 with all our treatments (incentives and 
conditions on the migrant, and incentives and conditions on his friends), and 
report OLS and IV results in Table 8.   If there is learning from others we expect to 
see  𝛾� > 0, because of the strong positive returns to migration.  Table 8 shows 
strong persistence in own migration: that inducing migration in 2008 with the 
randomized treatments leads those same induced migrants to re-migrate in 2009.  
However, friends’ migration choices the previous year have no impact on 2009 
migration decisions, and this is a reasonably precisely estimated zero effect. This 
suggests that people learn from their own experience, but do not learn from the 
experiences of others. This provides strong support for the assumption that risk is 
idiosyncratic as implied by the model. 
Why is learning so individual-specific? The 2011 follow-up survey provides 
a strong hint: Of the 2011 migrants provided incentives in 2008, 60% report going 
back to work for the same employer at the same destination.  Appendix Table 7 
shows that being treated in 2008 leads to a 5 percentage point greater likelihood of 
re-migrating and working for the same employer.   A likely source of uncertainty 
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in the returns to migration thus appears to be the (potential) employer’s 
incomplete information about the characteristics of specific migrants – are they 
reliable, honest, hard-working? The typical employer in Dhaka is a rickshaw 
garage owner who has to trust a migrant with his valuable asset.  Research in India 
has documented that migrants sometimes abandon the rented rickshaws at the 
train or bus station (Jain & Sood, 2012).  This would make it difficult for migrants 
to “learn” from other villagers to resolve the uncertainty.24  
 Furthermore, migrants who were provided incentives in 2008 and who 
continue working for the same employer in 2011 are significantly more likely to 
have formed a connection to that specific employer in 2008, when they were 
originally induced to go.  Specifically, treatment group migrants are 16% more 
likely to report forming the job connection to their current (2011) employer in 2008 
instead of 2007, relative to “regular” migrants in the control group.25  This is again 
strongly suggestive that the migrants who were induced to migrate by our 
treatments formed an asset (a connection to an employer) at the destination, which 
continued to provide value three years later. 
Finally, among households that migrated in 2008 (in both incentive and 
control groups), we asked whether these households knew someone at the 
destination, or whether they had a job lead at the destination. These measures can 
be thought of as proxies for whether the household’s type has been revealed – 
households that have a connection have already determined their status while 
those that do not have not, or know that they are bad at migrating.26 Our model 
implies that the incentive will only have an impact on those that do not know their 
24 Friends and relatives could potentially vouch for each other with employers, but this need not be 
believed.  Further, making such a referral could be quite costly, it may put the referrers own job in danger, or 
require the referrer to look after a new migrant, perhaps providing some risk sharing and sharing housing. 
25  Appendix Table 8 shows the results of the t-tests. Results are statistically significant at conventional levels 
for the difference tests (e.g. 2007 vs 2008), but not for the difference-in-difference (e.g. 2007 vs 2008, treatment 
vs control) tests.   
26 According to our model, those that have migrated and know they are bad should not be in this sample 
that is entirely made up of migrators. 
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status and so we expect to see more migrators without a connection in the 
incentive group. Table 9 shows that migrants in the control group are much more 
likely to know someone at the destination, and to have a job lead, than are those in 
the incentive treatment. This suggests that our treatment induced migrants among 
those that had not already determined their status, as implied by the model.  
6.3.2 Evidence on Learning 
 The fact that learning should be destination specific – a connection in 
Dhaka, for example, is not useful when migrating to Bogra – allows us to test more 
directly for learning effects using experimental variation induced by our 
treatments.  One of our treatments assigned a specific destination city (Bogra, 
Dhaka, Munshigonj or Tangail) as a condition of receiving the migration incentive, 
and creates exogenous variation in the destination choices in 2008.  Learning or 
creating a job connection implies that migrants assigned to a specific location 
should be more likely to return to that particular location in 2009 than to any other.  
Let 𝐷𝑖 be an indicator taking value 1 if household i migrated to destination 
D in 2009, and 𝐷𝑖08 be an indicator taking value 1 if household i migrated to 
destination D in 2008.   We run regressions of the form 
 𝐷𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖08 + 𝜖𝑖  
for each of four destinations.  The 2008 migration destination choice is 
instrumented with the location randomly assigned to the household: 
𝐷𝑖
08 = 𝜆 + 𝜌𝑇𝐷𝑖08 + 𝜂𝑖 , 
where 𝑇𝐷𝑖08 is an indicator taking on value one if the households was assigned to 
location D in 2008.  Appendix Table 9 shows these first stage estimates to establish 
that initial destination assignment had a strong effect on destination choices in 
2008.  The hypothesis of destination specific learning implies that there should be 
more than one significant coefficient in the second stage estimates displayed in 
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Table 10.27  We see that all coefficients, instrumented with our location 
requirements, are positive and that two are significant at the 10% level (Dhaka and 
Munshigonj). The coefficients also imply quantitatively important stickiness. 
Households randomly assigned to migrate to Munshigonj in 2008 are 30% more 
likely to re-migrate to Munshigonj in 2009 than to any other location. We take this 
as evidence in favour of location specific learning or the accumulation of 
connections at the destination as being an important driver of migration behavior. 
Our model also suggests that some induced migrants should discover that 
they are bad migrators, while some discover that they are good.  Among regular 
migrants, however, our model predicts no such effects – only households that 
know they are good at migrating should migrate in the control group.  Figure 7 
shows evidence consistent with this.  In the treatment groups (credit or cash) those 
that chose to re-migrate in 2009 had a significantly better migration experience in 
2008 than those who chose not to re-migrate.  In the control group, however, we 
see no such effect.   
6.4 Subsistence 
Our model postulates that households may not migrate because they are 
close to subsistence, and risk falling below subsistence if they have a bad migration 
outcome.  We can study the distribution of expenditures and caloric intake to 
examine whether this setup is warranted.   
The Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics classifies a person as ultra-poor if they 
consume less than 1605 calories, and it is usually thought that something between 
27 There may be inherent differences in profitability of each location, and just showing that those assigned to 
migrate to Dhaka are more likely than others to re-migrate to Dhaka is consistent with Dhaka simply being the 
most profitable place to migrate, and re-migration simply reflecting initial success. We overcome this issue by 
observing that only one destination can be the most profitable, and examining re-migration propensities for all 
4 of our assigned destination. We will need to show that migration assignment leads to destination-specific re-
migration to at least two different cities. Note that location specific learning does not imply that all regressions 
would have positive coefficients -- some locations may just be really bad placed to migrate. 
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600 and 1000 calories are required just to survive. Based on the prices collected in 
our baseline survey, and assuming very basic calorie composition, we estimate that 
it would cost about 660 Taka per person per month to meet the ultra-poor level, 
450 taka to consume 1000 calories and 250 Taka to consume 600 calories. 
Comparing these figures to the distribution of per-capita expenditures in our 
sample presented in Appendix Figure 1, we see that a substantial portion of 
households are close to subsistence.  Appendix Figure 2 shows directly the 
histogram of calories per person per day in the control group in our December 
2008 follow-up.  Many households in the control group can be characterized as 
“close to subsistence” in terms of caloric intake.  Comparing the treatment and 
control histograms, we again see that our treatment moved many people from a 
subsistence level of consumption (of 800-1300 calories per person per day) to a 
comfortable level exceeding 2000 calories per person per day. 
Our model suggests that if aversion to the risk of falling below subsistence 
is an important deterrent to migration, then: (a) people close to subsistence should 
not be migrating in the control group, and (b) our treatment should have the 
largest effect on households that are close to subsistence: they should be the ones 
induced to migrate by our incentive.  The three panels in Figure 8 show strong 
evidence in favor of these two claims graphically and in a regression. We measure 
subsistence as the proportion of total household expenditures devoted to food. The 
regression and the graphs show that those closer to subsistence are significantly 
less likely to migrate in the control group, and their migration decisions respond 
most strongly to the treatment.  
6.5 Does the Model Rationalize Responses to all Treatments? 
The model allows us to understand the impact of specific treatments designed to 
help households accumulate sufficient cash on hand to engage in profitable 
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migration. In this section we compare the impacts of several potential policies on 
which we have collected data. 
First, as noted above our initial treatments included both a cash and a credit 
incentive. In practice these two incentives have approximately the same impact on 
the migration rate. Here we argue that this finding is consistent with the model, if 
credit is seen as incorporating a limited liability aspect. An assumption of limited 
liability is consistent with the fact that only 80% of households repaid the loan. 
We can capture the limited liability effect of credit by noting that 
households have to have a reason to repay their loans. Let 𝑀(𝑥) = 𝐵(𝑥 − 𝐹) if the 
household is a bad migrator a 𝑀(𝑥) = 𝐺(𝑥) if the houshold is a good migrator, and 
consider a household that has a loan of value L and is required to repay Z. The 
household will repay the loan iff 
  
𝑀(𝑥 − 𝑍) ≥ 𝑀(𝑥 + 𝐿) − 𝑃, 
  
where P is a utility cost of punishment by the lender. P is assumed to be state 
independent as the punishment should reflect the long run value of credit to the 
household. With this formulation there is 𝑥�𝐵 and 𝑥�𝐺  such that the loan will be 
repaid by a bad migrator if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥�𝐵and by a good migrator if 𝑥 ≥ 𝑥�𝐺 . It is easy to 
show that 𝑥�𝐵 < 𝑥�𝐺  and that a bad migrator will always default on the loan if the 
cost of migration, F, is large enough. Further, because utility becomes infinitely 
negative when consumption approaches subsistence, to a first approximation, 
𝑀(𝑥�𝐵 + 𝐿) ≈ 𝑀(𝑥�𝐵 + 𝐿) − 𝑃 for a bad migrator for whom  𝑥 − 𝐹 is close to 
subsistence.  This implies that the utility cost P need not have a large impact on the 
ability of the credit contract to provide insurance. 
To incorporate these observations into the above model, assume that 
𝑥�𝐵 < 𝑥� < 𝑥�𝐺 . This assumption implies that a first time migrator that discovers it is 
a bad migrator will not repay the loan, but a first time migrator that is good, will 
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repay the loan. As discussed above, the decision to migrate is determined by the 
intersection between the curves 𝑉𝑀 and 𝑉𝑁, if 𝐵′(𝑥�) is large and positive and 𝐺′(𝑥�) 
is small, then the impact of credit and cash will be, approximately, the same. 
Consequently, the model can capture the idea that credit and cash will have the 
same impact. Obviously from a policy perspective, credit is a much less costly 
intervention. Interpreted in the light of this analysis, the fact that credit and cash 
treatments have a similar impact on migration rates again suggests that risk, which 
is mitigated by the limited liability aspect of the loan, is important in explaining 
our data. 
Second, as noted above, we returned in 2011 and implemented new 
treatments. One of these treatments was an unconditional credit contract of the 
same size at the conditional credit transfer. Our motivation for this experiment was 
to rule out the possibility that households were merely cash constrained. Our 
model implies that the credit incentive should have a larger impact as it moves 
only the 𝑉𝑀 curve, while the unconditional credit raises the 𝑉𝑁 curve as well. This 
is an implication of any model in which a household weighs the returns to 
migration relative to other possible uses of the money, but is not an implication of 
a model where the household knows that migration is profitable, but simply 
cannot afford it. The results of this experiment are shown in Table 7, and show 
that, consistent with our model but inconsistent with the cash constraint model, the 
unconditional transfer has a smaller impact than the conditional transfer.28 
6.6 Summary of Qualitative Tests 
In summary, both descriptive and experimental analyses of the data indicate 
that our model accurately captures many key aspects of the environment: 
background income is volatile, migration is risky, savings is high and migration is 
28 Although we presented the products in a similar way, if household perceptions of repayment requirements 
varied between the conditional and unconditional loans, that may also lead to differential take-up.   
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an experience good. The model also rationalizes most of the data coming from our 
experiment:  the fact that credit and cash have similar sized impacts, the fact that 
the incentive was most effective for those that are close to subsistence, the relative 
impacts of unconditional and conditional transfers, and the response to the 
insurance treatment.  What remains to be seen, however, is whether the model 
brings all of these ingredients of the migration decision together in a way that can 
quantitatively account for the magnitude of the experimental effects.  
7 Quantitative Calibration of the Model 
Our quantitative exercise will use the data to calibrate all the free parameters 
of the model except risk aversion.  We then ask what level of risk aversion would 
be required to match key aspects of the data. Table 11 shows the parameters we 
use for the quantitative exercise.  In all cases we have erred on the side of allowing 
the model to generate the experimental estimates.  This choice reflects the fact that 
we will ultimately argue that the model in its basic form is not able to rationalize 
the experimental estimates.  
Three choices deserve special mention.   First, we assume that there are two 
opportunities to migrate each year (or two time periods per year): one after each 
planting season.  This means that a time period for the purpose of the model 
should be thought of as half a year.  Second, we assume that the cost of migration, 
F, must be borne over 1 month, so that consumption when migration is bad is very 
low.  This reflects the fact that most households earn money during the monga 
season and use it to pay for consumption.  Credit constrained households will have 
to pay for migration out of this income.  This choice is obviously quite extreme but 
could be justified by arguing that the extremely low consumption for a one-month 
period would have a large effect on utility relative to the remaining months in the 
monga period with a higher consumption level.  Third, we assume that income at 
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home is distributed 𝑁(700,70).  This is an attempt to estimate the income 
distribution of the lowest 50% of households in the sample.  We argue that the 
results of the full model are not sensitive to this choice. 
We undertake two different exercises.  First, we use the model to determine 
four cutoff points – 𝑥�, 𝑥�𝐼 , 𝑥�𝐶 and 𝑥�𝑈𝐶𝑇 – the amount of cash on hand required to 
migrate with no intervention, with our cash incentive, with a credit incentive and 
with an unconditional cash transfer, respectively.  We then match these levels of 
cash on hand to the histogram of consumption levels in the control group and ask 
what portion of the distribution lies between the relevant bounds to estimate the 
set of migrants that our treatments are predicted to induce.  For example, we 
consider the density of households consuming between 𝑥𝐼�  and 𝑥� to estimate the 
portion of households that would be induced to migrate by our incentive.  This 
exercise essentially ignores the repeat migration effect and learning.  
Our second exercise is to ask what portion of households can still be 
induced to migrate after t periods.  A household is “induceable” in period t if it has 
never migrated before. In the model, only such households will be affected by our 
migration incentive, as other households will have already determined their status 
as good or bad migrators.   For this exercise, we make use of the assumed 
background income distribution to determine the probability of a household 
crossing the migrating threshold  𝑥� in each period.  If the number of induceable 
households is very low after only a small number of time periods, then the model 
cannot rationalize the experimental results.29  
We undertake these two exercises under three different sets of assumptions.  
First, we consider a completely static model, where households do not save for 
migration and do not consider the benefits of ongoing migration when they make 
their initial migration choice – i.e. they are myopic past the current migration 
29 In fact, in all the results presented below we depart slightly from the above model and assume that 
households that migrate and are determined to be bad migrators are also induceable.  This errs on the side of 
allowing the model to fit the data. 
 41 
                                                 
period.   Figure 9 shows results for this static model: the left panel shows the 
portion of migrants that would be induced assuming no repeat migration and the 
right panel shows the number of induceable migrants as a function of the time 
period.  Consider first the left panel.  The model predicts that with a risk aversion 
level of 𝜎 ≈ 1.15 the incentive would induce about 20% of households to migrate – 
consistent with our experimental findings.  Further, the cash and credit incentives 
have the same effect, again consistent with our experimental findings.  However, 
the UCT and incentive treatments have similar effects for low levels of risk 
aversion, and this is not consistent with our results.  
The right panel shows that we need to assume a slightly higher risk 
aversion level to rationalize the data if we account for repeat migration.  With a 
risk aversion level of about 1.65, 40% of the population are induceable after 8 
seasons (or 4 years), which corresponds to a 20% treatment effect if the model 
applies to the poorest half of the sample.  If we allow 10 prior years of migration 
activity, the model suggests that 𝜎 ≈ 1.7 would be required to rationalize our 
treatment effect.30   
For our second calibration, we continue to assume that there is no savings, 
but allow households to be forward looking.  This has a strong impact on the 
propensity to migrate. The left panel of Figure 10 shows the results for the fraction 
of households induced to migrate by different treatments.  Comparing this Figure 
to the left panel of Figure 9 shows that for low levels of risk aversion our incentive 
is actually better at inducing migration when we account for forward looking 
behavior.  This is because, without the repeat migration effect our incentive does 
not induce all households to migrate.  At higher levels of risk aversion this 
difference is no longer relevant and the repeat migration incentive leads to higher 
levels of baseline migration and a smaller impact of our incentive. The hump shape 
30 This result is very sensitive to the assumption about the distribution of background risk.  If we have 
underestimated the background risk, then greater risk aversion would be needed to rationalize the data. 
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occurs because, as risk aversion increases, the value of migration as a risk 
mitigation activity increases.  The figure shows that at some point this effect 
dominates the other impact of risk aversion, which is to make experimenting with 
migration less tolerable.  The figure suggests that a risk aversion level of 1 is 
required to rationalize the data if we do not consider the repeat migration effect. 
The right panel of Figure 10 shows the fraction of induceable migrants when 
households are forward looking, but cannot save up.  The hump in the portion of 
induced migrants in the left panel implies that we need not consider risk aversion 
levels above about 7 – as 𝜎 increases past this point risk aversion in fact reduces the 
propensity to migrate.31  After 4 years, 40% of the sample will be induceable if risk 
aversion is as high as 5.  If we consider longer time horizons such as 10 years, then 
the figure implies that no level of risk aversion is high enough to allow for a large 
number of induceable migrants.    
The results in Figure 10 may, however, overestimate the importance of 
migration.  Because we do not allow savings, households are unable to buffer, and 
the value of migration as a risk mitigation strategy is increased.  Figure 11 shows 
the results for the full model, where we allow for both buffer stock savings, and for 
the agent to save up for migration.  The left panel confirms the intuition that 
savings reduces the value of migration.  The right hand panel, however, shows 
that the ability to save up dominates: once we allow for savings we would need a 
risk aversion of 11.5 to replicate our treatment effects allowing 4 years of migration 
activity, and if we allow 10 years of migration activity, even a risk aversion level of 
20 is insufficient to rationalize the results.32   
31 The hump in the left panel is based on the empirical distribution of consumption levels.  For the 
simulations shown in the right panel we make use of our assumed distribution which leads to a maximal effect 
of the incentive at a risk aversion level of 7. 
32 These results assume that households begin time with no assets and the lowest possible income shock.  
We use the model to generate policy functions as well as cutoff values.  We then simulate the model for 10,000 
households and ask what portion of those 10000 households have not migrated after t periods. 
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The results allowing for savings suggest a sense in which our main 
conclusions are robust to our assumption regarding the distribution of income.  We 
have simulated the right panel of Figure 11 for standard deviations in from 40 to 
140 and the results are almost identical.  As discussed above there are several 
impacts of increasing the degree of background risk, and the simulations suggest 
that, given our calibrations, these effects cancel each other out. 
We can also use the full model to ask whether the observed level of savings 
is consistent with the model.  For a risk aversion level of 0.5 the model predicts a 
household will hold, on average 1500 Taka in savings, which is roughly in line 
with what we see in the data.  For higher levels of risk aversion, however, the 
model predicts far more savings than we observe: at a risk aversion level of 5, 
predicted average savings is close to 3000 Taka and at 𝜎 = 10 we predict savings of 
nearly 5000 Taka.  It is not possible to match both the level of savings and the 
responses to the migration treatments at any given level of assumed risk aversion. 
8 Extensions 
While the qualitative evaluation of the model had shown that households 
do save, that they respond to migration incentives in ways predicted by the model, 
and that they perceive migration to be risky, the calibration exercise suggests that 
to match the magnitudes of responses and household behaviors, we have to extend 
the model in some ways.  It could be that households under-estimate the benefits 
of migration, or they fail to actively save up for migration, or they are insufficiently 
forward-looking.  In this section we discuss extensions to our baseline model that 
would allow us to better accommodate the data. In all cases, we do not have the 
data to determine conclusively which extensions are the most important.  We 
therefore see this section more as an extended call for more work.  We provide 
some suggestive evidence from our data of approaches that are unlikely to work. 
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In part, we offer a great number of possibilities to highlight the uncertainty and the 
need for additional experimentation before moving to policy prescriptions. 
8.1 Alternative Specifications of the Returns to Migration 
It seems clear that the migration process is risky, and m is likely stochastic 
even for good migrators.  To assess the importance of this possibility, we re-
simulated the model with the assumption that m was normally distributed around 
the mean of 550, with a standard deviation of 100. This additional risk does not 
appreciably alter the results presented in Figure 10 above. 
We also explored a slightly different model, in which migration truncates 
the distribution of income below, rather than adding to it.  We draw on Figure 6 to 
assume that migration truncates the distribution at around 1100 Taka per 
household member per month.  This model does not perform very differently from 
our baseline model: it explains the data better if we ignore savings, but once 
savings is accounted for the results are similar.   
8.2 Very High Levels of Risk Aversion 
If we allow σ to be very high, then the model can rationalize most of the data. The 
literature has not arrived at a consensus on “reasonable” values for σ:  Holt and 
Laury (2002) state that someone with σ >1.37  should “stay in bed”, while papers in 
the equity premium literature (e.g. Kandel & Stambaugh, 1991) argue that values 
as high as 30 may be reasonable. In our model, households are much more risk 
averse than implied by their 𝜎 because they become infinitely risk averse as 
consumption approaches the subsistence point.  In circumstances analogous to 
ours, Chetty and Szeidl (2007) show that agents even in developed countries 
become more risk averse with commitments for consumption.  In future research, 
it would be worth exploring at what point risk aversion might be considered to be 
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a “mistake” that a policy maker should seek to address.  If extreme risk aversion is 
akin to a behavioral bias, then adding conditions to transfers may improve a 
migrator’s utility over unconditional cash transfers. 
8.3 Lowering the Discount Factor 
Lowering the discount factor decreases both the willingness to save up for 
migration, and the extent to which future migration outcomes affect the current 
choice to migrate.  Figure 12 shows the set of induceable migrants using the full 
model and setting 𝛿 = 0.8.  The figure shows that if we are willing to assume a risk 
aversion level of about 7 we can rationalize the data even with a time horizon of 10 
years.  Lowering the discount factor even more would allow us to match the 
experimental results for any level of risk aversion.  A similar effect can be achieved 
if we allow for depreciation in the status of being a good migrator due, for 
example, to random breakdowns of connections at the destination. However, if we 
bound the depreciation rate to allow for the small drop in migration rates that we 
observe between 2008 and 2011, it is still the case that very high levels of risk 
aversion are required to rationalize the data.  
8.4 Dis-utility from Migration 
Seasonal migration is probably a somewhat unpleasant experience, because it 
requires migrants to be separated from family, and share more congested space 
with other men in cities, often in or around slums with poor access to public 
services.  If this utility cost of migration (not captured in our consumption and 
earnings data) is high enough, it could explain the initial reluctance to migrate. To 
assess this possibility we asked 1600 households in our sample a stated preference 
question in 2011: “Would you prefer to stay at home and earn 70 Taka per day, or 
to migrate and earn x Taka”. We asked for 𝑥 ∈ {90,110,130,150}, and the fraction of 
 46 
respondents who stated they were willing to migrate were {58, 77, 83, 91} 
respectively.  Their responses imply that for every Taka increase in earnings per 
day at the destination, migration probability increases by 0.5 percentage points.  
Extrapolating, the respondents would have to be compensated Tk. 15,000 to induce 
them to migrate for 75 days (which is the average length of migration).33  These 
results suggest quite a high utility cost of migration.34  To incorporate these figures 
into our quantitative analysis we take a very simple approach: we reduce the 
return to migration to m/2 – an assumption consistent with 70 Taka at home being 
worth 140 away, towards the high end of the answers we received.  The results do 
not change drastically in the full model (with savings) under this assumption. 
Migration continues to be a good way to mitigate risk and households will want to 
save up for it.   
8.5 Incorrect Beliefs 
In our calibration above we assumed that households were correct in their beliefs 
about 𝜋𝐺, m and F. If households have incorrect beliefs then it would be much 
easier to rationalize our empirical observations. Beliefs could be incorrect for two 
conceptually distinct reasons. First, beliefs may be correct on average, but some 
households have optimistic beliefs while others are pessimistic. In such a model 
optimistic households would migrate and the pessimistic would not.  Then non-
33 We also estimate this “demand curve for staying at home” with a revealed preference approach, using the 
fact that re-migration in 2009 was strongly responsive to migration earnings in 2008.  That analysis suggests 
that re-migration probability increased by 1.7 percentage points for every 1000 Taka increases in migration 
earnings. Under some mild assumption, this implies that migrants induced by our treatment in 2008 would 
have to be compensated Tk. 21,700 to induce them to re-migrate in 2009.    
34 Banerjee and Duflo (2007) arrive at a similar conclusion while describing the lives of the poor – “Why 
Don’t the Poor Migrate for Longer…given that they could easily earn much more by doing so?” “The ultimate reason 
seems to be that making more money is not a … large enough priority to experience several months of living alone and 
often sleeping on the ground somewhere in or around the work premises.”   
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migrators would appear to be systematically biased (Spinnewijn, 2012). Second, it 
may be that beliefs are systematically pessimistic.35 
To test whether biased beliefs are important, we asked all migrants in both 
treatment and control groups about how their migration experience, in terms of 
time it took to find work and their earnings at destination, compared to their 
expectations prior to migration.  For either interpretation of bias – systematic or on 
average correct – we would expect that those in the control group, who were 
already migrating and had had a chance to learn, would have roughly correct 
beliefs, while those in the treatment group would have beliefs biased toward the 
overly pessimistic.36  Results presented in Table 12 are not consistent with biased 
beliefs: treatment group migrants do not have significantly different beliefs from 
control group migrants.  
8.6 Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity does not seem to be a particularly attractive way to accommodate 
the data. For example, if we imagine that some households have a high m and 
some a low m, this helps us to rationalize the lack of migration for the low m 
households, but makes it even more difficult for the high m households. 
8.7 Savings Constraints 
The slightly different character of our results for the model with and without 
savings points to the possible conclusion that it is savings behavior in our setting 
that is the real anomaly (why are people not saving up to migrate?).  Our sample 
households may be savings-constrained due to sharing norms (Jakiela & Ozier, 
35 This could be because non-migrators have access to incorrect information.  McKenzie et al. (2007) argue 
that migrant households provide incorrect information because they do not want to have to share resources, or 
job connections and accommodation at the destination.  
36 To be clear, it is not evidence of incorrect beliefs that some people found the experience worse than 
anticipated, this is perfectly consistent with an ex-post statement about an ex-ante risky event.  The prediction 
of biased beliefs is that those in the treatment should be more likely to have done better than expected. 
 48 
                                                 
2012), or they may simply be no safe place to store things.  This conclusion is 
consistent with recent research that demonstrates very large impacts of simple 
interventions that relax savings constraints (e.g. Dupas & Robinson, 2013b).  Two 
caveats should be mentioned, however.  First, before citing savings constraints as 
the key issue, it is necessary to understand why households are able to buffer, but 
not to save up a lump-sum amount for migration.  Second, the right panel of 
Figure 10, in which we consider a forward looking household that cannot save, 
suggest that there is a need to understand more than just savings constraints, we 
must also understand why households act as though they are not aware of the full 
benefits of migration. 
  Another related avenue to consider may be the need to share risk and solve 
public goods problems in general. Risk sharing networks not only constrain 
savings; they may also deter profitable investments (e.g. Lewis, 1955).  Migrating 
away may undermine network ties, and this may be a hidden cost of migration 
(Munshi & Rosenzweig, 2009).  We lack the data necessary to explore this channel. 
8.8 Behavioral or Psychological Explanations 
Many models that fall under the rubric of behavioral economics could be used to 
explain the results. In this area we are particularly wary of making 
pronouncements without data, as there are many different possible explanations of 
this type. Here we mention just two models that have been applied to developing 
country contexts.  First, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model of Laibson (1997) 
can likely to applied to rationalize the data for some values of 𝛽.   The version of 
this model discussed in Duflo, Kremer and Robinson (2011) provides an 
explanation for low savings.  The version of this model discussed in Banerjee and 
Mullainathan (2010) can explain why households do not undertake profitable 
investments.  Their model also suggests that commitment devices could be useful 
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policy interventions.  Second, Koszegi and Rabin (2006)’s model of reference 
dependence can likely rationalize the data. That model provides a non-self control 
based explanation for the fact that household find themselves to be perpetually 
without the money they need to invest: households adjust their expected 
consumption in response to shocks and then assess the costs of investments 
relative to this expected consumption level. 
 In summary, there are numerous avenues that could be pursued to get a 
better quantitative accounting of the data generated by our experiment. We have 
noted just a few. We are currently working on isolating which factors are most 
relevant in other settings where seasonal migration is relevant. 
9 Concluding Remarks 
We conducted a randomized experiment in which we incentivized 
households in a famine-prone region of Bangladesh to send a seasonal migrant to 
an urban area. The main results show that a small incentive led to a large increase 
in the number of seasonal migrants, that the migration was successful on average 
(in terms of improving consumption by around 30%), and that households given 
the incentive in one year continued to be more likely to migrate in future years.  
These results bolster the case made by Clemens et al (2008), Rosenzweig (2006), 
Gibson and McKenzie (2010), Clemens (2011), Rodrik (New York Times, 2007) and 
Hanson (2009) that offering migration opportunities has large effects on welfare, 
even relative to other promising development interventions in health, education, 
trade or agriculture.  The literature largely focuses on international migration, and 
we show that the returns to internal migration – a much more common, but under-
studied phenomenon37 – are also large.    
37 There were 240 times as many internal migrants in China in 2001 as there were international migrants 
(Ping, 2003), and 4.3 million people migrated internally in the 5 years leading up to the 1999 Vietnam census 
compared to only 300,000 international migrants (Anh, 2003).   
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We argue that the results are qualitatively consistent with a simple (rational) 
model of a poverty trap where households that are close to subsistence face a small 
possibility that migrating will turn out badly, leaving household consumption 
below subsistence.  The model helps us to understand the types of situation in 
which we would expect incentive and insurance policies to lead to long-term 
benefits as observed in our experiment. We should look for situations in which the 
investment is risky, that risk is individual-specific, and where the utility cost of the 
downside risk is large (e.g. the household is close to subsistence). These 
predictions also provide an answer to the puzzle that motivated the entire project: 
why does Rangpur – the poorest region of the country that regularly faces a 
seasonal famine - have a lower out-migration rate compared to the rest of 
Bangladesh?  This can also explain other peculiar migration patterns noticed in the 
literature – the lower out-migration rate among poorer Europeans (Hatton & 
Williamson, 1998) and poorer South-Africans (Ardington et al., 2009).   
Our quantitative work implies that we cannot provide a fully satisfying 
explanation for why people in Rangpur had not saved up to migrate.38  We are 
therefore hesitant to draw policy implications from our research.  However, it is 
clear that the migration support programs we implement help some Rangpur 
households cope with the Monga famine, and appear more cost-effective than 
subsidizing food purchases on an ongoing basis, which is the major anti-famine 
policy tool currently employed by the Bangladesh government (Government of 
Bangladesh 2005; Khandker et al., 2011).  Two important caveats are that our 
research does not capture long-term psychological and social effects of migration, 
and the scale of our experiment does not permit us to analyze potential adverse 
38 Several other papers document very high rates of return to small capital investments in developing 
countries (Udry & Anagol, 2006; de Mel et al., 2008; Bandiera et al., 2011; Duflo et al., 2011; Fafchamps et al., 
2011), and this literature must also confront the same question of why households do not save to invest in 
these high-return activities.   
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general equilibrium effects in destination labor markets if the government were to 
contemplate scaling up such a program.39   
If there are net efficiency gains, this is likely because our intervention 
mitigates the spatial mismatch between where people live, and where jobs are 
during the pre-harvest months. This approach may be of relevance to other 
countries that face geographic concentrations of poverty, such as northern Nigeria, 
eastern islands of Indonesia, northeast India, southeast Mexico, and inland 
southwest China (Jalan & Ravallion, 2001).  More generally, providing credit to 
enable households to search for jobs, and aid spatial and seasonal matching 
between employers and employees may be a useful way to augment the 
microcredit concept currently more narrowly focused on creating new 
entrepreneurs and new businesses.40  The potential efficiency gains raise an 
interesting question of why private sector entities do not profit by developing 
mechanisms that link migrants to employers in the city. To understand this, we 
interviewed several employers in Dhaka.  The employers reported that there are in 
fact “labor sardars” who bring migrant workers to Dhaka, but the process is 
fraught with uncertainty and risk. Migrants have to be paid the one-way bus ticket 
and some salary in advance, but it is difficult to enforce any long-term contract if 
they disappear and choose to go work elsewhere after the transit cost is paid.    
  
39 There is mixed evidence in the literature on whether these effects are substantial (Ottaviano & Peri, 
(forthcoming); Borjas, 2003; Borjas & Katz, 2007; Card, 2009).  Moreover, general equilibrium effects may be 
positive in net, if spillover benefits at the origin exceed external costs at the destination.  Migrants form a much 
larger part of the village economy at the origin compared to the destination urban economy. 
40 With credit contracts, it may be difficult to collect regular repayment from migrants who move away, but 
one of the world’s largest micro-credit NGOs, BRAC, has recently introduced credit programs to finance even 
international migration.  
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Diff  I v NI  P‐value
Cash Credit Control Info
Consumption of Food 805.86 813.65 818.68 768.64 15.84 0.638
(19.16) (40.91) (31.76) (18.00) (33.57)
Consumption of Non‐Food 248.98 262.38 248.4 237.35 12.23 0.278
(5.84) (6.74) (9.28) (7.99) (11.20)
Total Consumption 1054.83 1076.03 1067.08 1005.99 28.06 0.465
(21.11) (42.08) (34.55) (22.77) (38.29)
2081.19 2079.51 2099.3 2021.31 20.25 0.585
(20.34) (22.76) (30.44) (32.56) (36.99)
45.66 45.3 46.26 44.75 ‐0.01 0.992
(0.54) (0.57) (0.77) (0.85) (0.92)
Consumption of Meat Products 25.04 18.24 27.13 20.71 ‐1.97 0.594
(2.58) (2.0) (3.24) (2.90) (3.69)
Consumption of Milk & Eggs 11.74 9.77 9.96 10.77 0.48 0.675
(0.79) (0.80) (1.12) (1.19) (1.13)
Consumption of Fish 42.17 39.86 41.36 45.98 ‐2.56 0.496
(1.83) (1.79) (2.76) (2.89) (3.74)
Consumption of Children's Education 24.14 27.14 22.31 16.95 6.01 0.016**
(1.75) (2.31) (2.34) (2.1) (2.44)
Consumption of Clothing and Shoes 37.31 38.8 39.24 38.35 ‐0.80 0.693
(0.79) (0.90) (1.41) (1.30) (2.02)
Consumption of Health for Male 52.39 52.9 63.72 47.45 ‐2.86 0.696
(5.14) (5.23) (8.15) (6.48) (7.28)
Consumption of Health for Female 37.34 52.5 39.36 49.75 ‐0.31 0.961
(3.52) (5.75) (5.68) (7.51) (6.26)
1345.55 1366.37 1418.29 1611.05 ‐160.56 0.255
(97.54) (121.26) (135.04) (185.56) (140.09)
HH size 3.93 3.98 3.99 4.05 ‐0.07 0.473
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
HH Head Education  1=Educated  0.25 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.628
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Number of Males  Age>14  1.19 1.22 1.18 1.18 0.03 0.515
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Number of Children   Age<9  1.01 1.05 1.08 1.15 ‐0.09 0.093
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Household has pucca walls  0.29 0.32 0.27 0.30 0.02 0.55
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Literacy score  average  3.37 3.40 3.48 3.30 ‐0.01 0.84
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
78.79 78.62 78.38 75.72 1.66 0.47
(0.77) (0.88) (1.15) (1.35) (2.32)
58.53 60.82 58.38 57.40 1.68 0.41
(1.07) (1.21) (1.64) (1.61) (2.04)
52.53 52.90 52.42 51.15 0.91 0.70
(1.13) (1.25) (1.78) (1.72) (2.40)
0.77 0.75 0.77 0.77 ‐0.01 0.21
(0.003) (0.09) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01)
6.53 6.49 6.24 6.20 0.27 0.24
(0.05) (0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.23)
0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 ‐0.00 0.75
(0.01) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.68 0.65 0.70 0.60 0.02 0.55
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Migration to Bogra in round 1 0.11 0.10 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.30



































Incentivized Cash Credit Not Incentivized Diff (I‐NI)
58% 59.0% 56.8% 36% 22***
(1.4) (1.87) (2.06) (1.96) (2.43)
47% 45% 49% 37% 10***
(1.41) (1.92) (2.12) (2.0) (2.46)
44% 40% 50% 36% 8***










61.876** 50.044* 15.644 48.642** 44.183* 280.792** 260.139** 102.714***
(29.048) (28.099) (40.177) (24.139) (23.926) (131.954) (128.053) (17.147)
34.885*** 27.817** 22.843 20.367** 16.726* 115.003** 99.924* 59.085***
(13.111) (12.425) (17.551) (9.662) (9.098) (56.692) (51.688) (8.960)
96.566*** 76.743** 38.521 68.359** 60.139** 391.193** 355.115** 160.696***
(34.610) (33.646) (50.975) (30.593) (29.683) (169.431) (158.835) (22.061)
106.819* 93.429 ‐85.977 142.629*** 129.901*** 842.673*** 757.602*** 317.495***
(62.974) (59.597) (76.337) (47.196) (48.057) (248.510) (250.317) (41.110)
2.852* 2.588 ‐0.509 2.977** 2.657** 17.442** 15.573** 6.777***
(1.557) (1.571) (2.089) (1.287) (1.273) (7.064) (6.830) (0.992)
12.325** 6.577 8.163 5.618 5.599 31.857 34.302 3.905
(5.489) (5.402) (6.667) (3.755) (3.726) (21.549) (21.399) (3.923)
8.979* 12.618** 8.977 6.297 5.193 34.652 28.775 8.901**
(4.743) (5.998) (6.076) (4.407) (4.142) (24.941) (22.909) (3.778)
6.146* 7.658** 1.546 6.110** 4.299* 30.848** 21.487 ‐3.677
(3.297) (3.441) (3.938) (2.485) (2.405) (14.144) (13.536) (2.355)
Sub‐district Fixed Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
























OLSITT ITT IV IV
Dependent Variable
Cash Credit Info
31.437 16.047 ‐37.521 42.691** 33.108* 225.232** 183.990** ‐26.029*
(23.587) (23.226) (28.255) (17.073) (16.849) (100.891) (92.927) (14.855)
3.471 30.840* ‐4.411 18.514 11.997 98.188 59.937 ‐2.369
(16.629) (17.871) (21.943) (13.034) (13.080) (72.243) (70.778) (10.865)
34.908 46.887 ‐41.932 61.205** 45.105* 323.420** 243.927* ‐28.398
(31.113) (33.736) (40.345) (24.655) (24.668) (144.313) (134.898) (21.342)
77.706 1.832 ‐91.558 87.148** 73.146* 466.907** 412.931** ‐33.656
(54.683) (60.426) (55.842) (37.337) (37.850) (217.023) (206.676) (28.901)
1.341 ‐0.062 ‐2.396* 1.862** 1.472* 9.898** 8.301* ‐0.891
(1.213) (1.280) (1.314) (0.822) (0.827) (4.778) (4.484) (0.713)
‐4.164 4.615 ‐4.090 1.980 1.630 9.572 7.376 ‐4.513
(5.048) (5.151) (6.109) (3.152) (3.177) (17.267) (17.148) (2.880)
5.090 ‐4.495 ‐3.045 2.083 1.519 11.072 9.998 2.600
(4.926) (5.037) (5.936) (3.513) (3.642) (19.095) (19.492) (2.670)
‐0.156 ‐0.585 ‐3.828 1.546 0.140 7.660 1.057 ‐5.635***
(2.742) (2.774) (2.976) (1.768) (1.615) (8.861) (7.910) (1.680)
Sub‐district Fixed Effects? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes






















ITT ITT IV IV OLS Mean
All Migrants Incentivized Not Incentivized Diff Obs
Total Savings by household 3,490.47 3,506.59 3,434.94 71.65 951
(97.22) (110.83) (202.80) (232.91)
Total Earnings by household 7,777.19 7,451.27 8,894.40 ‐1443.129** 952
(244.77) (264.99) (586.14) (583.83)
Savings per day 56.76 56.46 57.79 ‐1.33 905
(1.15) (1.29) (2.56) (2.77)
Earnings per day 99.39 96.09 111.15 ‐15.06** 926
(1.75) (1.92) (4.0) (4.2)
Remittances per day 18.34 16.94 23.33 ‐6.39** 927
(1.06) (1.19) (2.28) (2.55)
Travel Cost per Episode 264.55 264.12 266.00 ‐1.88 953






Sector Dhaka Mushigonj Tangail  Bogra Other
Total 
earnings
Agriculture 17.54 75.00 91.15 89.62 46.83 3230.52
(1.71) (2.50) (1.89) (2.26) (2.26) (77.68)
Non‐ag day laborer 20.56 9.00 5.75 3.83 19.02 6039.72
(1.82) (1.66) (1.55) (1.42) (1.78) (317.52)
Transport 40.93 11.00 1.33 1.09 15.34 4993.81
(2.21) (1.81) (0.76) (0.77) (1.63) (203.12)
Other 20.97 5.00 1.77 5.46 18.81 5645.98
(1.83) (1.26) (0.88) (1.68) (1.77) (321.72)
Number of migration 
episodes 496 300 226 183 489 1,694
5005.06 3777.30 2897.88 2491.07 5160.60









Dep. Var.: Migrated in 2011 (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.156*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.180***
(0.077) (0.075) (0.073) (0.072)
0.139*** 0.149*** 0.228*** 0.224***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
0.099 0.102 0.135*** 0.134***













District Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.214*** 0.197*** 0.126*** 0.120***
(0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.061)
Observations 2,051 2,050 2,043 2,043





























Dep. Var.: Migration in 2009 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
0.392*** 0.410*** 0.392*** 0.464*** 0.393*** 0.436*** 0.392*** 0.476***







0.097*** 0.088 0.095** 0.062 0.098*** 0.078 0.095** 0.052
(0.037) (0.083) (0.038) (0.078) (0.037) (0.076) (0.038) (0.077)
Observations 1818 1818 1818 1818 1797 1797 1797 1797










First Episode  47% 64% 17***
(1.85) (3.30) (3.8)
Any Episode 55% 62% 6.3*
(1.80) (3.23) (3.70)
Incentive Non incentive Diff
First Episode  27% 44% 17***
(1.64) (3.41) (3.55)
Any Episode 31% 44% 12.8***
(1.67) (3.30) (3.56)
Incentive Non incentive Diff
First Episode  30% 32% 1.6
(1.70) (3.20) (3.6)


















0.317*** 0.213 ‐0.014 ‐0.002 0.027 0.073 0.059 0.038
(0.068) (0.148) (0.012) (0.008) (0.050) (0.054) (0.037) (0.060)
Observations 589 589 589 589 589 589 589 589
R‐squared 0.195 0.132 0.205 0.032 0.305 0.081 0.155 0.085
1st F‐test 1.139 4.338 2.116 0.980
1st pvalue 0.345 0.000166 0.0412 0.456
1st partial R2 0.0119 0.0561 0.0616 0.0217
Hansen J0 4.272 7.142 8.882 3.920
R2 overall 0.132 0.0317 0.0814 0.0849









0.248*** 0.127 0.076 0.098 0.079 0.098 0.138 0.182
(0.070) (0.126) (0.097) (0.085) (0.175) (0.174) (0.096) (0.120)
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480
R‐squared 0.179 0.067 0.127 0.032 0.181 0.117 0.220 0.061
1st F‐test 0.986 4.649 2.706 1.781
1st pvalue 0.452 8.24e‐05 0.0100 0.0905
1st partial R2 0.0166 0.0775 0.0554 0.0354
Hansen J0 7.374 4.322 16.50 4.131



































Table 11. Parameters Used for Calibration 
 
Parameter Calibration Notes 
u(c) (𝑐 − 𝑠)1−𝜎1 − 𝜎  HARA utility function. 
s 
250 Taka per hh member 
per month 
Enough for about 600 Calories 
per hh member per month 
𝜋𝐺  0.5 
The portion of induced migrants 
that remigrate 
F 
250 Taka per hh member 
per month 
600 Taka for bus fare, plus 6 
days of foregone labor at 60 
Taka per day.  Spread over 4 hh 
members 
m 
550 per household member 
per month 
Solution to: 
𝜋𝐺  (𝑚 + 𝐼) =  350  
where 350 is our LATE estimate 
and I is the size of our incentive. 
𝜇(𝑦) 𝑁(700,7) per household 
member, per month 
Designed to look like the 
distribution of the bottom half of 
the population 
Time Period 6 months 
We assume the choice to migrate 
can be made after planting for 
either of the agricultural 
seasons. 
𝛿 0.99  
I (incentive 
size) 
200 Taka per household 
member 






























































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months
Rest of the country Rangpur
HIES 2005




























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months
Rest of the country Rural Rangpur
HIES 2000



















Seasonality - Quantity Rice per HouseholdPanel D.























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Months
Rest of the country Rangpur
Agricultural Season Survey Experimental Design
Jul., 2008 Baseline Survey – July, 2008
2008 Planting of Aman Rice  Aug., 2008 • 1900 households, 100 villages
• Household roster, assets , economic activities, agricultural production, 








Oct., 2008 Follow‐up Survey, Consumption Data – Oct.‐Nov., 2008









May, 2009 Follow‐up Survey, Migration Data – May, 2009















Dec., 2009 • 1900 households, 100 villages
• Employment, consumption
• Migration episodes since April, 2009Jan., 2010
samp e  n eac  group, ran om ze a  
the household level
Jan., 2011 Baseline Survey – Jan., 2011










2011 Boro Rice Harvest Jul., 2011 Follow‐up Survey, Round 4 – July, 2011
• 2527 households, 133 villages
















Panel A Panel B
Figure 6. Distribution of Consumption in Control Villages subtracted from 
Distribution of Consumption in Treatment Villages
Panel A. Risk: If the Migration Incentive was not paid out, and the migration cost had to be 
borne by the household
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Subsistence is defined as percentage of food expenditures on total expenditures
Subsistence Level in Round 1 by Treatment
Panel C: Migration Rates across the Distribution of Food 
Panel A: Migration Rat s and Baseline Subsistence Level (by Treatment Status)





















Panel A Panel B
Figure 10. Forward‐looking Agents, but no Savings
Panel A Panel B
Figure 11. Full Model with Buffer Stock Savings and Possibility of Saving up for Migration





































































sample  of  1900  households  (in  100  villages),  plus  247  new  households  in  13  new 
randomly  selected villages  from  the  same  two districts  (Kurigram  and Lalmonirhat).   
The treatments (most of which encouraged migration,  like the 2008 experiments) were 
randomized at  the village  level.   They were offered  in February, 2011,  just before  the 
onset of the 2011 “mini‐Monga season,” which is the pre‐harvest lean season associated 
with the lesser of the two annual rice harvests. The treatments were therefore designed 




control group  in 2011.   We also  chose not  to  intervene again  in 19 villages  that were 
offered the credit treatment in 2008.  These 19 villages are labeled “Impure Control” in 
the  regression  table,  and  they  allow  us  to  study  the  long‐run  effects  of  offering 
migration credit in 2008. 
Credit conditional on migration: Sample households in 15 villages received the 
same  zero‐interest  loan  conditional  on  a  household member migrating,  as  offered  in 
2008.  The credit amount was raised to Tk.800 (~US$10.8) to reflect inflation in the cost 








Conditional Credit with destination  rainfall  insurance: Sample households  in 
24 villages were offered the same zero interest Tk.800 (~US$10.8) credit conditional on 
migration,  but  the  repayment  terms  were  conditioned  on  rainfall  outcomes  in  one 
popular  migration  destination:  Bogra.  Too  much  rainfall  (and  flooding)  is  a  risk  in 
Bangladesh,  and  can  lower  migrant  earnings,  particularly  for  outdoor  work  like 
rickshaw‐pulling and  construction  site work. We purchased 10 years of daily  rainfall 
data from the local meteorological department, imputed the probability distribution of 
rainy days during the pre‐harvest migration period, and calculated the actuarially fair 
insurance premium and payoff amounts. Our  loan contract specified  that  if rainfall  in 
Bogra  for March/April  2011  remained  “normal”  (4 days or  less),  the migrants would 




Note  that  this  is a  loan contract, but  the repayment rules  introduce a  feature of 
index insurance against too much rainfall.1 The treatment design takes advantage of the 
fact  that  the  contract  offers  differential  basis  risk  for  households  that  differ  along 
identifiable baseline characteristics: those who had a propensity for traveling to Bogra, 
and non‐farmers.  Basis risk from the index contract is lower for these two groups.   
All  treatments  described  above  were  proportionally  balanced  across  the 
Information, Cash  and Credit  treatments  from  2008  (and Control  villages  from  2008 
were retained as long‐term controls as described above).  In some other sample villages 
from  2008,  we  conducted  other  treatments  that  are  not  relevant  for  the  analysis 
conducted in this paper, and we therefore do not discuss those treatments here. 
                                                 
1 Note that the contract can be explained to borrowers like a standard credit contract, and the insurance feature is only introduced 





uses  it  to  argue  that  our  2011  insurance  experiment  can  be  used  to  test  whether 
migration is risky and migrants are risk averse.2 
There are two payoff relevant states {L,H} which lead to income at the destination 






൛݌ݎሺܮܴுሻ ൌ 1 െ ߨோ െ ݎ; ݌ݎሺܪܴ௅ሻ ൌ ߨோ െ ݎ; 	݌ݎሺܪܴுሻ ൌ ߨ௬ െ ߨோ ൅ ݎൟ 
We assume that r depends on the characteristics of the migrator. In particular, we 
assume: 
1. Basis risk is larger for farmers than for non‐farmers ݎி ൐ ݎேி; and 
2. Basis risk is smaller for those that are more likely to migrate to Bogra: ݎ஻ ൏ ݎே஻. 
We make the first assumption because the insurance contract pays in a high rain 
situation. High rain is likely to reduce income of day laborers who work, for example, 





2 See also Bryan (2012) for an application of the model presented here. 






the migration  rate.  To  do  so, we  suppose  that  potential migrators  all  face  the  same 
(expected)  income  given  migration  (i.e.  there  is  no  heterogeneity  in  the  migration 
process  except  for  r),  but  that  potential migrators  are  heterogeneous with  respect  to 
their returns to remaining at home.4  In particular, we assume that the expected utility 




ܨ ቀߨ௬ݑሺݕ௛ሻ ൅ ൫1 െ ߨ௬൯ݑሺݕ௅ሻቁ, 
and with insurance by 
ܨ ቀݎݑሺݕ௅ െ ܿሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨோ െ ݎሻݑሺݕ௅ ൅ ݌ሻ ൅ ሺߨோ െ ݎሻݑሺݕு െ ܿሻ ൅ ൫ߨ௬ െ ߨோ ൅ ݎ൯ݑሺݕு ൅ ݌ሻቁ 
If F does not depend on  the  type of migrator  except, perhaps,  through purely 
horizontal  shifts,  then  the  change  in  the probability of migration  (or  equivalently  the 
portion of the population migrating) is proportional to 
ቀݎݑሺݕ௅ െ ܿሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߨோ െ ݎሻݑሺݕ௅ ൅ ݌ሻ ൅ ሺߨோ െ ݎሻݑሺݕு െ ܿሻ ൅ ൫ߨ௬ െ ߨோ ൅ ݎ൯ݑሺݕு ൅ ݌ሻቁ െ




4 This is easily generalized and our regressions presented in the main text allow for differences in the return to 
migration for farmers, non-farmers and those that are going to Bogra. 
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Proposition  1  (Basis  risk  is  only  relevant  if migration  is  risky).   The  portion  of 
people  induced to migrate by  insurance  is decreasing  in r  if and only  if migration  is risky and 
migrators are risk averse. 
Proof.   The  “only  if”  follows because  r drops out of  (1) when migration  is not 
risky. The “if” follows because an increase in r is a mean preserving spread, so the left 
hand side of (1) must be decreasing in r so long as migrators are risk averse. 
This  proposition,  combined with  our  assumptions  on  r  leads  to  the  following 
joint test: 













































































49.674** 48.292** 20.427 39.033* 222.288* ‐7.835
(23.752) (23.015) (36.787) (21.745) (124.365) (15.422)
35.320** 28.121** 20.817 21.721** 122.929* 32.930***
(14.941) (14.046) (18.860) (10.348) (63.274) (8.621)
104.162*** 86.081*** 41.620 75.234** 429.585** 61.339***
(32.672) (31.318) (49.635) (30.031) (176.462) (20.343)
120.927** 111.339** ‐66.444 148.964*** 869.842*** 102.951***
(54.673) (51.398) (68.194) (42.735) (243.784) (38.129)
50.506* 46.669* 5.063 46.219* 267.336** 67.936***
(26.961) (26.185) (38.967) (23.648) (133.310) (17.226)
29.778** 25.690* 18.536 18.774* 106.119* 45.519***
(13.686) (13.495) (18.144) (9.917) (59.272) (9.152)
80.085** 71.211** 23.634 64.328** 368.937** 112.357***
(31.663) (31.784) (49.575) (29.958) (171.948) (22.179)
69.645 77.571 ‐117.409 130.875*** 775.485*** 218.266***
(65.251) (62.278) (76.655) (48.946) (274.635) (41.640)
56.019* 49.215* 21.065 42.498* 243.791* 80.573***
(28.385) (27.493) (40.053) (24.070) (132.883) (16.898)
32.313** 27.335** 25.281 17.586* 98.361* 49.524***
(13.170) (12.594) (17.941) (9.593) (56.223) (8.738)
88.138** 75.440** 46.380 59.440* 337.769** 129.019***
(34.016) (33.216) (51.202) (30.518) (170.467) (21.769)
90.556 91.954 ‐69.585 125.294*** 737.107*** 252.609***





Panel A: number of household members is based on question Q7 in R2 follow-up survey ("status of household 
members")
Panel B: number of household members is based on Q9 in R2 follow-up survey ("currently present members")



















65.320** 52.001* 16.532 50.952** 294.218** 114.443***
(29.708) (29.165) (40.476) (24.395) (130.921) (17.779)
37.317*** 28.879** 22.655 22.246** 126.026** 63.824***
(13.105) (12.307) (17.403) (9.709) (56.518) (9.154)
102.441*** 79.753** 39.221 72.541** 415.549** 177.147***
(35.327) (34.650) (51.050) (30.846) (167.430) (22.851)
115.229* 97.084 ‐83.808 147.739*** 872.820*** 350.271***
(65.440) (63.041) (77.209) (48.055) (243.244) (41.971)
68.356 58.472 ‐29.407 78.084 454.672 ‐22.104
(125.876) (126.579) (171.409) (104.435) (584.120) (59.784)
81.562* 53.790 60.009 39.126 219.877 41.280
(41.239) (40.458) (48.636) (31.682) (179.086) (25.780)
149.230 108.306 30.727 114.917 660.329 15.572
(143.280) (145.175) (203.232) (125.865) (701.793) (74.566)
‐9.354 ‐21.278 ‐426.987 193.855 1,169.733 22.695
















Panel D: household size is based on the total number of household members present in the last 14 days 
Panel E: Total monthly consumption per household; no adjustment to household size
Dep. Var.: 
ITT IV ITT IV ITT IV ITT IV
591.617*** 585.653 1.929 0.744
(170.718) (708.002) (1.315) (0.951)
3,287.602*** 3,281.877 11.059 4.474
(869.377) (3,773.748) (7.944) (5.348)
Controls? No No No No No No No No
Observations 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,851 1,854 1,854 1,836 1,836
R‐squared 0.052 0.285 0.026 0.103 0.031 ‐0.034 0.017 ‐0.005














Constant 881.546*** 765.099*** 1,094.635***
(18.215) (25.513) (15.676)
Sub‐district FE? no no no
Observations 1,855 1,782 1,798




Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev Mean St.dev
Share with positive current savings 0.53 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.34 0.48 0.49 0.50
Total value of current cash savings for all HHs 745.45 1,629.28 787.04 1,616.97 768.33 2,280.19 798.83 1,885.58
Total value of current cash savings for HHs with 
reported savings
1,416.36 2,023.58 1,385.29 1,942.77 2,233.72 3,442.41 1,624.94 2,427.08
Share with liquid assets 0.42 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.81 0.39 1,556.14 3,018.54
Total value of liquid assets for all HHs 339.35 1,154.88 494.58 1,292.40 1,390.12 3,115.53 0.60 0.49
Total value of liquid assets for HHs with reported 
assets
812.05 1,676.18 844.30 1,599.04 1,709.12 3,374.84 1,269.59 2,712.63
1 if purchased assets in last 12 months (all HHs) 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.20 0.40 757.45 2,185.75
Value of purchased assets in the last 12 months 6.26 89.65 9.37 195.36 122.89 1,476.58 0.07 0.26
Total savings (current + liquid assets) for all HHs 1,084.80 2,057.72 1,281.62 2,185.67 2,157.30 4,028.99 41.36 549.42
Total savings (current + liquid assets) for HHs with 
reported savings or assets
























2007 2008 Difference P‐value Obs
0.42 0.58 ‐0.17 0.0941 103
(0.05) (0.05)
2006‐7 2008‐9 Difference P‐value Obs
0.43 0.57 ‐0.13 0.0567 201
(0.04) (0.04)
Not Incentivized Incentivized Difference P‐value Obs
0.50 0.58 ‐0.08 0.2589 189
(0.05) (0.05)
Not Incentivized Incentivized Difference P‐value Obs




















Dep. Var.: Migrated in 2008 to: Dhaka Bogra Tangail Munshigonj
‐0.032 0.125** ‐0.052 0.010
(0.088) (0.051) (0.075) (0.083)
0.035 0.085* 0.017 ‐0.056
(0.088) (0.048) (0.077) (0.083)
0.009 0.052 0.016 0.019
(0.102) (0.049) (0.088) (0.094)
‐0.045 0.022 ‐0.022 ‐0.011
(0.046) (0.053) (0.054) (0.051)
‐0.001 0.053 ‐0.041 0.008
(0.058) (0.057) (0.051) (0.049)
‐0.048 ‐0.018 0.059 0.054
(0.050) (0.052) (0.066) (0.072)
‐0.020 ‐0.059* ‐0.078* ‐0.007









0.427*** ‐0.075* 0.142* 0.295
(0.148) (0.043) (0.072) (0.187)
Observations 589 589 589 589
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